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Abstract
I develop a theory of risk diversification through geography. In a general equilibrium trade
model with monopolistic competition, characterized by stochastic demand, risk-averse en-
trepreneurs exploit the spatial correlation of demand across countries to lower the variance
of their global sales. I show that the model-consistent measure of demand risk, the “Diversi-
fication Index”, depends on the multilateral covariance of a country’s demand with all other
markets. The model implies that both the probability of entry and the level of trade flows
to a market are increasing in the Diversification Index. The firms’ risk diversification behav-
ior can generate, upon a trade liberalization, a strong competitive pressure on prices, which
in general equilibrium can lead to higher welfare gains from trade than the ones predicted
by trade models with risk neutrality. Using a panel of domestic and international sales of
Portuguese firms, I estimate “risk-augmented” gravity regressions, which show that the Di-
versification Index significantly affects trade patterns at the extensive and intensive margins.
I quantify that the risk diversification channel increases welfare gains from trade by 16% rela-
tive to models with risk neutrality. Finally, the quantitative application highlights the role of
demand uncertainty in shaping the economic consequences of the recent integration of China
in the global economy.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical evidence has shown that demand shocks explain a large fraction of the
variation in firm sales across countries (see Eaton et al. (2011), Di Giovanni et al. (2014),
Munch and Nguyen (2014) and Hottman et al. (2015) among others). When selling to
a market, firms may not be able to perfectly insure against unexpected demand fluctu-
ations. The role of demand uncertainty is particularly important in the case of costly
irreversible investments, such as producing a new good or selling to a new destination
(see Handley and Limao (2015)). In fact, according to a survey among 350 leading compa-
nies across the world, dealing with demand risk is the most important business challenge
for global firms.1 Therefore, it is crucial to understand how demand risk affects firms
behavior across markets, and evaluate its economic implications.
I provide a theoretical characterization and an empirical assessment of the importance
of demand risk for firms behavior on global markets. I argue that exporting to foreign
countries is an opportunity to diversify demand risk. Selling to destinations with imper-
fectly correlated demand can hedge firms against idiosyncratic shocks hitting sales, in the
spirit of classical portfolio theory (Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1964)). While this is an
intuitive mechanism, it has not been fully explored by the macro and international trade
literature. In a multi-country general equilibriummodel of trade with spatially correlated
demand, I characterize how firms’ risk diversification behavior affects trade patterns and
study its general equilibrium implications. I quantify that risk diversification explains
15% of trade patterns, and increases welfare gains from trade by 16% relative to models
with risk neutrality.
In the first tier of my analysis, I develop a general equilibrium trade model with mo-
nopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms, along the lines of Melitz (2003). The
model is characterized by two novel elements. First, the demand for a differentiated
variety is subject to country-variety shocks, which I allow to be imperfectly correlated
across countries. This is the only source of uncertainty in the economy, and it can re-
flect shocks to tastes, consumers confidence, regulation, firm reputation, etc.2 Second,
firms are owned by risk-averse entrepreneurs. This assumption is motivated by the ev-
idence, discussed in Section 2, that the volatility of cash-flows is a primary concern for
1This survey was conducted in 2012 by the consulting firm Capgemini:
https://www.capgemini.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The_2012_Global_Supply_Chain_Agenda.pdf
2For tractability, I rule out aggregate shocks that affect all varieties, as in Eaton et al. (2011) and Nguyen
(2012). This is consistent with the recent empirical evidence that firm-destination specific shocks, rather
than aggregate shocks, account for the overwhelming majority of the variation in firms’ sales across coun-
tries (see e.g. Di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Hottman et al. (2015)). Nevertheless, when I allow for aggregate
demand shocks in a robustness exercise, the results do not substantially differ from the baseline.
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many companies across the globe, especially if the managers’ compensation is tied to the
performance of the firm (see Ross (2004) and Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012)).3
The entrepreneurs’ problem consists of two stages. In the first stage, entrepreneurs
do not know the realization of the demand shocks, but make an irreversible investment:
they choose in which countries to operate, and in these markets perform costly marketing
and distributional activities. After the investment is made, in the second stage firms learn
the consumers demand and produce. The spatial correlation of demand across countries
implies that, in the investment stage, entrepreneurs face a combinatorial problem, since
both the extensive and the intensive margin decisions are interdependent across markets.
I overcome this challenge by assuming that firms send costly ads in each country
where they want to sell. These activities allow firms to reach a fraction n of the consumers
in each location, as in Arkolakis (2010). This implies that the firm’s choice variable is con-
tinuous rather than discrete, and thus firms simultaneously choose where to sell (depend-
ing on whether n is optimally zero or positive) and how much to sell (firms can choose
to sell to some or all consumers). Therefore, the firm’s extensive and intensive margin
decisions are not taken market by market, but rather performing a global diversification
strategy, along the lines of the “portfolio analysis” pioneered by Markowitz (1952) and
Sharpe (1964).4
I characterize the model-consistent exogenous measure of risk, which I name “Diver-
sification Index.” This variable measures the diversification benefits that a market can
provide to firms exporting there, and it depends on the entire pattern of spatial covari-
ance of demand across countries.5 I show that the probability of entering a market and
the intensity of trade flows are increasing in the market’s Diversification Index. If de-
mand in a country is relatively stable and negatively/mildly correlated with demand in
the other countries, then entrepreneurs optimally choose, ceteribus paribus, to export more
there to hedge their business risk. This implies a fundamental trade-off: selling to a “re-
mote” destination may require higher trade and marketing costs, but it may also hedge
firms against domestic fluctuations in demand.
I then evaluate the aggregate implications of the firms’ risk diversification behavior.
3In the special case of no risk aversion, my model is isomorphic to standard gravity models with mo-
nopolistic competition and Pareto distributed firms’ productivities, as in Arkolakis et al. (2008) and Chaney
(2008).
4The concavity of the firm’s problem that arises from the presence of risk also implies that, if the deter-
minant of the covariance matrix is strictly positive, the optimal solution is unique.
5The Diversification Index can be seen as a multivariate generalization of the classical Sharpe Ratio,
proposed by Sharpe (1966) and used in finance to assess the risk-return profile of an asset. In fact, in
the limit case in which all demand correlations are zero, the Diversification Index equals the simple ratio
between mean and variance, similarly to the Sharpe Ratio, which is computed as an asset’s “excess average
return” divided by its standard deviation.
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In a two-country version of the model, I provide an analytical characterization of the
welfare gains from trade. When the covariance of demand between the two countries is
sufficiently low, firms use more intensively international trade to hedge their domestic
demand risk. This implies a stronger competitive pressure among firms, which in gen-
eral equilibrium generates a “pro-competitive” effect which can lead to higher welfare
gains from trade than in standard models with risk neutrality, such as the class of models
considered in Arkolakis et al. (2012) (ACR henceforth).6
To assess the quantitative relevance of the risk diversification benefits of international
trade, and test the model’s predictions, I rely on a panel dataset of Portuguese manufac-
turing firms’ domestic and international sales, from 1995 to 2005. Portugal exports to a
wide range of destinations, and therefore is a good laboratory to study the implications
of risk diversification for international trade.
First, I structurally recover the unobserved demand shocks from the observed yearly
firm-destination sales. I identify the demand shocks as innovations from the growth rate
of domestic and international sales, similarly to Di Giovanni et al. (2014). The empirical
methodology controls for unobserved firm and destination characteristics, and for firm-
destination supply responses.7 Under the assumption of log-normally distributed de-
mand, routinely maintained by the literature (see Cochrane (2009) and Eaton et al. (2011)
among others), I estimate the country-level means and covariance matrix of the demand
shocks, and compute the Diversification Index. The results show that countries more
geographically distant from each other have significantly lower bilateral covariance of
demand, suggesting the existence of a trade-off between distance and risk diversification.
In addition, countries with lower GDP per capita tend to have a lower Diversification In-
dex, consistent with the evidence shown in Koren and Tenreyro (2007) with very different
measures of risk.
Using the Portuguese firm-level data, I then estimate “risk-augmented” gravity re-
gressions at the firm-destination level, which document that both the extensive and in-
tensive margins of trade, even after controlling for standard gravity variables, are signif-
icantly affected by the model-consistent measure of risk. In addition, I document that
both the mean/standard deviation ratio and the average covariance across countries, the
key components of the Diversification Index, significantly affect trade flows. As an exter-
nal validation, I also run “risk-augmented” gravity regressions at the country and sector
6These include the models in Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003), and Chaney
(2008).
7In particular, I include firms’ investment rates, capital intensity and productivity, interacted with coun-
try dummies, to control for the endogenous response of these variables to foreign demand shocks, as doc-
umented by Mayer et al. (2016) and Friedrich et al. (2018), which could affect the observed sales.
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level, using bilateral manufacturing trade flows in 2005, which confirm the firm-level
findings.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I calibrate the remaining parameters of
the model. Using the firm’s first order conditions, I estimate the entrepreneurs’s risk aver-
sion in the cross-section of Portuguese firms. The implied “risk premium” is quite large,
lending support to the assumption that firms are risk averse. The structural calibration
suggests that, overall, the risk diversification motive explains 15% of the observed varia-
tion in trade flows. In addition, I show that my model reproduces the existence of many
small exporters observed in the data (see e.g. Arkolakis (2010) and Eaton et al. (2011)),
since risk averse firms may optimally reach only few consumers in a given market.8
I use the structural model to quantify the risk diversification benefits of international
trade. Specifically, I follow Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) and compute the wel-
fare gains of going from autarky, i.e. a world where trade costs are infinitely high, to the
observed trade equilibrium in 2005. The results illustrate that countries, like for instance
Ireland, Singapore and Germany, that have cheaper access to destinations that are a good
hedge against risk (i.e. destinations with a lower covariance with domestic demand), are
able to significantly improve their risk-return profile upon a trade liberalization. In gen-
eral, an improvement of the average risk-return profile is typically reflected into higher
welfare gains, which are, for the median country, 16% higher than ACR. Therefore, the
“pro-competitive” effects of the firms’ risk diversification behavior are quantitatively rel-
evant.
Moreover, I explore the welfare implications of the recent integration of China in the
world economy. When I shock the calibrated model with the 30% increase in Chinese
productivity observed in the data between 2005 and 2015, real wages rise in all countries,
due to the availability of cheaper goods, but there is a reduction in the entrepreneurs’
welfare. The reason is that the Chinese productivity boom lowers the export activity of
firms from other countries, reducing their profits but also their ability to diversify risk
with international trade. This worsens their risk-return profile, exacerbating the negative
effects of the shock on entrepreneurs, and implying an aggregate welfare effect, for the
median country, of only 0.2%.
This paper contributes to the literature studying the importance of uncertainty for
international trade and welfare, such as Handley and Limao (2015), Fillat and Garetto
(2015) and Allen and Atkin (2016), as well as the literature that investigates more directly
8This stands in contrast with trade models with fixed costs, such as Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008),
which require large fixed costs to match the observed firm entry patterns, contradicting the existence of
many small exporters. In addition, while fixed costs models always imply “strict sorting” of exporters into
foreign destinations, my framework does not, consistent with the data.
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the behavior of exporters under risk, such as Rob and Vettas (2003), Ramondo et al. (2013),
and Impullitti et al. (2013).9 My contribution relative to these works is threefold. First,
while they typically focus on the volatility as measure of risk, I generalize their approach
and highlight the importance of the spatial correlation of demand, as captured by the
Diversification Index, in shaping the firms’ export behavior. Second, I provide a novel
characterization of the welfare gains from trade as a function of demand risk, and deter-
mine, after a structural estimation, its quantitative importance.10 Third, I document the
role of demand uncertainty in shaping the economic consequences of the recent integra-
tion of China in the global economy, contributing also to the quantitative literature on the
economic effects of the recent Chinese boom (see e.g. Caliendo et al. (2015), Galle et al.
(2017) and Adao et al. (2019)).
There is a vast literature, across several fields, that has proposed different measures
of uncertainty and studied their impact on the economy. These include proxies based on,
among others, stock prices (Bloom (2009)), newspaper coverage (Baker et al. (2016)), tariff
gaps (Pierce and Schott (2016)), GDP volatility (Koren and Tenreyro (2007)), consumption
volatility (Boguth and Kuehn (2013)). The Diversification Index proposed in this paper
captures a distinct aspect of uncertainty compared to existing measures, as it takes into
account for the entire pattern of spatial covariance of demand across countries. Therefore,
it can be used as a model-consistent proxy for demand risk in any cross-country empirical
analysis.
The insights provided in this paper apply also to other contexts characterized by un-
certainty. For instance, if there is uncertainty about trade policy in a given country (e.g. as
for the US-China trade relationships before 2001, as in Pierce and Schott (2016), Handley
and Limão (2017), Bianconi et al. (2020) and Alessandria et al. (2019)), firms may diversify
such risk by exporting to other countries where trade policy is more predictable. My re-
sults suggest that failing to take into account for the risk diversification behavior of firms
may imply a severe miscalculation of the welfare impact of uncertainty on the economy.
Risk diversification is a well-known mechanism studied by the finance literature, and
it has been applied also in other settings. However, the novelty of this paper is to show
that, in the context of a trade model, risk diversification can generate “pro-competitive”
effects through general equilibrium forces. Therefore, the paper contributes also to the
9Other related works are Riaño (2011), Nguyen (2012), Vannoorenberghe (2012), Vannoorenberghe et al.
(2014), De Sousa et al. (2015), Gervais (2016), Conteduca et al. (2017) and Blaum et al. (2020). For earlier
contributions, see Helpman and Razin (1978), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Newbery and Stiglitz (1984),
Eaton and Grossman (1985) and Maloney and Azevedo (1995).
10For this reason, the paper also innovates in respect to the vast literature that examines the determinants
of the welfare gains from trade, see e.g. Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Melitz and Redding (2015).
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literature studying the different sources of pro-competitive effects of international trade
(see e.g. Edmond et al. (2015), De Blas and Russ (2015), Feenstra andWeinstein (2017) and
Arkolakis et al. (2018)).
The paper also relates to the broad literature that studies the determinants of trade
patterns. Theoretically, previous models of firms’ export decision have typically assumed
that exporters make independent entry decisions for each destination market - see Melitz
(2003), Chaney (2008) and Helpman et al. (2008a) among others. In contrast, in my model
entry in a market depends on the global diversification strategy of the firm, which I char-
acterize despite its inherent complexity. Other existing works, such as Morales et al.
(2015), Ahn and McQuoid (2017) and Lind and Ramondo (2018), feature interdepen-
dence of exporting decisions across markets, but arising from supply-side forces, rather
than from demand linkages. Empirically, while the existing literature has highlighted
the importance of firm-destination shocks for the cross-sectional variation of sales (see
e.g. Di Giovanni et al. (2014), Hottman et al. (2015), and Eaton et al. (2011)), a distinct
contribution of this paper is to document that the spatial correlation of such shocks has
important consequences for trade patterns.
Lastly, the paper complements the strand of literature that studies the effect of inter-
national trade on macroeconomic volatility. Di Giovanni et al. (2014) and di Giovanni
et al. (2018) investigate the role of individual firms in international business cycle co-
movement and aggregate volatility. di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) and Caselli et al.
(2015) study the effect of trade openness on aggregate output volatility. My paper, in con-
trast, sheds light on the other direction, i.e. how demand risk affects international trade
patterns through the firms’ risk diversification behavior.11
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general
equilibrium model with risk averse entrepreneurs. In Section 3 I estimate the relevant
parameters of the model and, in Section 4, test its predictions in the data. In Section 5
I perform the counterfactual exercises and investigate their robustness, while Section 6
concludes.
11Note also that the risk diversification mechanism highlighted in my paper is consistent with the em-
pirical evidence that countries trading more with each other have more correlated business cycles (Frankel
and Rose (1998), Kose and Yi (2006), Burstein et al. (2008) and Kleinert et al. (2015)). Indeed, this evidence
typically refers to bilateral correlations in aggregate output at the business cycle frequency, while my the-
oretical and empirical results show the importance of the long-run multilateral covariance of demand in
shaping trade patterns.
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2 A trade model with risk-averse entrepreneurs
In this section, I first propose a static multi-country general equilibrium trade model
with N asymmetric countries, featuring stochastic demand and risk averse entrepreneurs.
Within the general framework, I characterize the optimal solution of the firms’ production
problem, and show that both the extensive and intensive margins of trade depend on a
model-consistent measure of demand risk. I then focus on the more tractable case of two
symmetric countries, and show how the spatial correlation of demand affects the welfare
gains from international trade.
2.1 Environment
Throughout the paper, I will denote the importing market by j, and the exporting market
by i, where i, j = 1, ...,N. Each country j is populated by a continuum of workers of mea-
sure L˜j, and a continuum of risk-averse entrepreneurs of measure Mj. Each entrepreneur
owns a non-transferable technology to produce, with a given productivity, a differenti-
ated variety under monopolistic competition, as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). To
focus only on international trade as a mechanism firms can use to diversify their risk, I
assume that financial markets are absent.12
Consumption. Both workers and entrepreneurs have access to a potentially different
set of goods Ωij. Each agent υ in country j chooses consumption by maximizing a CES
aggregator of a continuum number of varieties, indexed with ω:
max Uj(υ) =
(
∑
i
∫
Ωij
αj(ω)
1
σ qj(ω, υ)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
(1)
s.to ∑
i
∫
Ωij
pj(ω)qj(ω, υ)dω ≤ yj(υ) (2)
where y(υ) is agent υ’s income, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across va-
rieties. Workers earn the same non-stochastic wage w by working (inelastically) for the
entrepreneurs. In contrast, entrepreneurs’ only source of income are the profits they ob-
tain from operating their firm.
The term αj(ω) reflects an exogenous demand shock specific to good ω in market j.
It is the only source of uncertainty in the economy, and it can reflect shocks to tastes, cli-
12This assumption captures in an extreme way the incompleteness of financial markets, and the fact that
often firms have limited access to financial derivatives to hedge risks (see Hentschel and Kothari (2001)
and Guay and Kothari (2003). An interesting avenue for future research would be to introduce complete
markets and compare the economic outcomes with those of the baseline model.
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matic conditions, consumers confidence, regulation, firm reputation, etc. Define α(ω) ≡
α1(ω), ...αN(ω) to be the vector of realizations of the demand shock for variety ω. I as-
sume that:
Assumption 3a α(ω) ∼ H (α¯,Σ), i.i.d. across ω
Assumption 3a states that the demand shocks are drawn, independently across vari-
eties, from a multivariate distribution characterized by a N-dimensional vector of means
α¯ and a N × N variance-covariance matrix Σ, where N is the number of countries. Given
the interpretation of αj(ω) as a consumption shifter, I assume that the distribution has
support over R+.
Assumption 3a implies that the demand shocks are destination-variety specific, thus
ruling out any aggregate shock that would affect the demand for all varieties in a given
destination. This is appealing on both theoretical and empirical grounds. From a theoret-
ical standpoint, I impose this assumption because, given the continuum of varieties, the
demand shocks average out by the Law of Large Numbers and thus I can treat aggregate
variables, such as wages and price indices, as non stochastic. In addition, this restric-
tion has been typically imposed by the literature that incorporates demand shocks into
an international trade model, such as Eaton et al. (2011), Crozet et al. (2012) and Nguyen
(2012). Besides for its tractability, Assumption 3a can be justified by the recent empiri-
cal evidence that firm-destination specific shocks account for the overwhelming majority
of the variation in firms’ sales across countries (see e.g. Di Giovanni et al. (2014) and
Hottman et al. (2015)).13 Nevertheless, in the empirical analysis I perform a robustness
exercise and allow for aggregate demand shocks, and show that the resulting estimated α¯
and Σ do not substantially differ from the baseline.14
Production. Entrepreneurs are the only owners and managers of their firms, and pro-
duce a unique variety ω using only labor, with a productivity z drawn from a known
distribution, as highlighted in Assumption 3b:
13Hottman et al. (2015) have shown that 50-70 percent of the variance in firm sales can be attributed to
differences in firm appeal. Eaton et al. (2011) and Kramarz et al. (2014) with French data and Munch and
Nguyen (2014) with Danish data have instead estimated that firm-destination idiosyncratic shocks drive
around 40-45% percent of sales variation. Di Giovanni et al. (2014) show that firm-specific components
account for the vast majority of the variation in sales growth rates across firms, the remaining being sectoral
and aggregate shocks. Recent contributions also include Bricongne et al. (2012), Nguyen (2012), Munch and
Nguyen (2014), Berman et al. (2015a) and Armenter and Koren (2015).
14Since the baseline model does not feature multiple sectors, I am also effectively assuming that different
sectors have the same degree of risk. However, in the empirical analysis I show that the predictions of the
model regarding the impact of demand uncertainty on trade patterns hold also at the sector level.
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Assumption 3b A firm producing variety ω draws a productivity z from a known distribu-
tion G(·), independently from other firms and from the demand shocks αj(ω).
Since each firm with a given productivity z produces a unique variety ω, to simplify
notation I will use z to identify both. Entrepreneurs choose how to operate their firm in
country i by maximizing the following indirect utility in real income:
max V
(
yi(z)
Pi
)
= E
(
yi(z)
Pi
)
− γ
2
Var
(
yi(z)
Pi
)
, (3)
where yi(z) equals net profits. The mean-variance specification above can be derived
assuming that the entrepreneurs maximize the expectation of a CARA utility in real in-
come.15 Such specification has been widely used in the portfolio allocation literature (see,
for example, Markowitz (1952), Sharpe (1964) and Ingersoll (1987)), and has the advan-
tage of having a constant absolute risk aversion, given by the parameter γ > 0, which
gives a lot of tractability to the model.16
The assumption of risk-averse entrepreneurs is the main departure of the model from
the existing literature. There is a recent literature supporting this assumption. Empir-
ically, Cucculelli et al. (2012) survey several Italian entrepreneurs in the manufacturing
sector and document that 76.4% of them are risk averse. A survey promoted by the con-
sulting firm Capgemini reveals that, among 350 managers and CEO of leading companies
across several countries, 52% of them believes that demand volatility is the most impor-
tant challenge for their firm, as shown in Figure 1. Further evidence that entrepreneurs
have a risk-averse behavior has been recently provided, in different contexts, by Herranz
et al. (2015) and Allen and Atkin (2016).
Theoretically, an extensive literature has shown that risk aversion arises if corporate
management seeks to avoid the costs of financial distress, when these costs are increasing
in the cash-flows volatility (see Froot et al. (1993) and Allayannis et al. (2008)), and if
the value of managers’ compensation is tied to the value of the firms, exposing them to
firm-specific risk (see Murphy (1999), Ross (2004), Parrino et al. (2005) and Panousi and
15If the entrepreneurs have a CARA utility with parameter γ, a second-order Taylor approximation of
the expected utility leads to the expression in 3 (see Eeckhoudt et al. (2005) and De Sousa et al. (2015) for a
standard proof). If the demand shocks are normally distributed, the expression in 3 is exact (see Ingersoll
(1987)). Maloney and Azevedo (1995), in the context of a trade model, also assume that firms maximize a
CARA utility.
16One shortcoming of the CARA utility is that the absolute risk aversion is independent from wealth.
In Appendix 8.1.15, I consider a variation of the model where the entrepreneurs maximize a CRRA utility,
which features a decreasing absolute risk aversion. Quantitatively, in Section 5.1.1 I show that the overall
implications for welfare gains do not change substantially.
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Papanikolaou (2012)).
2.2 The production problem
The production problem consists of two stages. In the first, firms know only the distribu-
tion of the demand shocks, H (α¯,Σ), but not their realization. Under uncertainty about
demand, firms make an irreversible investment: they choose in which countries to op-
erate, and in these markets perform costly marketing and distributional activities. After
the investment in marketing costs, firms learn the realized demand. I assume that the
investment decision cannot be changed after the demand is observed. Therefore, firms
cannot change neither the set of destinations, nor the marketing investment made in such
countries.17 Finally, firms produce with a production function linear in labor and en-
trepreneurs spend their realized profits across different consumption goods, according to
their sub-utility function in (1).
The fact that demand is correlated across countries implies that, in the first stage, en-
trepreneurs face a combinatorial problem. Indeed, both the extensive margin (whether to
export to a market) and the intensive margin (howmuch to invest in marketing) decisions
are intertwined across markets: any decision taken in a market affects the outcome in the
others. Then, for a given number of potential countries N, the choice set includes 2N ele-
ments, and computing the indirect utility function corresponding to each of its elements
would be computationally unfeasible.18
I deal with such computational challenge by assuming that, in the first stage, firms
send costly ads in each country where they want to sell. These activities allow firms to
reach a fraction nij(z) of consumers in location j, as in Arkolakis (2010). This implies that
the firm’s choice variable is continuous rather than discrete, and thus firms simultane-
ously choose where to sell (if nij(z) is optimally zero, firm z does not sell in country j) and
how much to sell (firms can choose to sell to some or all consumers).
The consumers’ maximization problem implies that the agent υ’s demand for variety
ω is:
qij(ω, υ) = αj(ω)
pij(ω)
−σ
P1−σj
yj(υ), (4)
17This assumption captures the idea that marketing and distributional activities present irreversibilities
that make reallocation too costly after the shocks are realized. An alternative interpretation of this irre-
versibility is that firms sign contracts with buyers before the actual demand is known, and the contracts
cannot be renegotiated. For a similar assumption, but in different settings, see Ramondo et al. (2013), Al-
bornoz et al. (2012) and Conconi et al. (2016).
18Other works in trade, such asMorales et al. (2014), Blaum et al. (2015), Antras et al. (2017) and Tintelnot
et al. (2018) deal with similar combinatorial problems, but in different contexts.
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where pij(ω) is the price of variety ω produced in i and sold in j, and Pj is the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz price index.
The fact that the ads are sent independently across firms and destinations, and the
existence of a continuum number of consumers, imply that the total demand in country j
for the variety produced by firm with productivity z is:
qij(z) = αj(z)
pij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
nij(z)Yj, (5)
where Yj is the total income spent by consumers in j, and Pj is the Dixit-Stiglitz price
index:
P1−σj ≡ ∑
i
Mi
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
αj(z)nij(z)
(
pij(z)
)1−σ
gi(z)h(α)dαdz, (6)
with gi(z) being the probability density of productivities of firms in i and h(α) the proba-
bility density of the demand shocks.
Therefore, the first stage problem consists of choosing nij(z) to maximize the following
objective function:
max{nij} ∑
j
E
(
piij(z)
Pi
)
− γ
2 ∑
j
∑
s
Cov
(
piij(z)
Pi
,
piis(z)
Pi
)
(7)
s. to 1 ≥ nij(z) ≥ 0 (8)
where piij(z) are net profits from destination j:
piij(z) = qij(z)pij(z)− qij(z)
τijwi
z
− fij(z), (9)
and τij ≥ 1 are iceberg trade costs and fij are marketing costs.19 In particular, I assume
that there is a non-stochastic cost, f j > 0, to reach each consumer in country j, and that
this cost is paid in foreign labor, as in Arkolakis et al. (2008).20 Thus, total marketing costs
are:
fij(z) = wj f jLjnij(z). (10)
19I normalize domestic trade barriers to τii = 1, and I further assume τij ≤ τivτvj for all i, j, v to exclude
the possibility of transportation arbitrage.
20This is without loss of generality, as in Arkolakis et al. (2008) and Arkolakis et al. (2012).
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where Lj ≡ L˜j + Mj is the total measure of consumers in country j.
The bounds on nij(z) in equation (8) are a resource constraint: the number of con-
sumers reached by a firm cannot be negative and cannot exceed the total size of the pop-
ulation. Using finance jargon, a firm cannot “short” consumers (nij(z) < 0) or “borrow”
them from other countries (nij(z) > 1). This makes the maximization problem in (7) more
challenging, because it is subject to 2N inequality constraints.21
The assumption that the shocks are independent across a continuum of varieties im-
plies that aggregate variables wj and Pj are non-stochastic. Therefore, plugging into piij(z)
the optimal consumers’ demand from equation (5), I can write expected profits more com-
pactly as:
E
(
piij(z)
)
= α¯jnij(z)rij(z)− 1
Pi
fij(z), (11)
where α¯j is the expected value of the demand shock in destination j, and
rij(z) ≡ 1Pi
Yjpij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
(
pij(z)−
τijwi
z
)
. (12)
Similarly, since marketing costs are non-stochastic, the covariance between piij(z) and
piis(z) is simply:
Cov
(
piij(z)
Pi
,
piis(z)
Pi
)
= nij(z)rij(z)nis(z)ris(z)Cov(αj, αs), (13)
where Cov(αj, αs) is the covariance between the shock in country j and in country s.
Although there is no analytical solution to the first stage problem, because of the pres-
ence of inequality constraints, we can take a look at the firm’s interior first order condi-
tion:
rij(z)α¯j − γrij(z)∑
s
nis(z)ris(z)Cov(αj, αs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal benefit
=
1
Pi
wj f jLj︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
. (14)
Equation (14) equates the realmarginal benefit of adding one consumer to its real marginal
cost. While the marginal cost is constant, the marginal benefit is decreasing in nij(z). In
particular, it is equal to the marginal revenues minus a “penalty” for risk, given by the
21In finance, it is well known that there is no closed form solution for a portfolio optimization problem
with lower and upper bounds (see Jagannathan and Ma (2002) and Ingersoll (1987)).
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sum of the profits covariances that destination j has with all other countries (including
itself). The higher the covariance of demand, and thus profits, in market j with the other
countries, the smaller the diversification benefits the market provides to a firm exporting
there.22
To find the general solution for nij and pij, I make the following assumption, which I
assume will hold throughout the paper:
Assumption 3c The determinant of the covariance matrix is strictly positive, i.e. det(Σ) > 0.
Assumption 3c is a necessary and sufficient condition to have uniqueness of the op-
timal solution. Since Σ is a covariance matrix, which by definition always has a non-
negative determinant, this assumption simply rules out the knife-edge case of a zero
determinant.23 Defining µ to be the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the
upper bound, and λ the one associated with the lower bound, I prove in Appendix 8.1.1
that the optimal solution is:
Proposition 1. For firm z from country i, the unique vector of optimal n satisfies:
n =
1
γ
Σ˜−1 [pi − µ + λ] , (15)
where Σ˜ is firm z’s matrix of profits covariances and pi is the vector of expected net profits. More-
over, the optimal price charged in destination j is a constant markup over the marginal cost:
pij(z) =
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
. (16)
Proposition 1 shows that the optimal solution, as expected, resembles the standard
mean-variance optimal rule, which dictates that the fraction of wealth allocated to each
asset is proportional to the inverse of the covariance matrix times the vector of expected
22Note the difference in the optimality condition with Arkolakis (2010). In his paper, the marginal benefit
of reaching an additional consumer is constant, while themarginal penetration cost is increasing in nij(z). In
my setting, instead, the marginal benefit of adding a consumer is decreasing in nij(z), due to the concavity
of the utility function of the entrepreneur, while the marginal cost is constant.
23A zero determinant can happen only in the case where all pairwise correlations are exactly 1.
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excess returns (see Ingersoll (1987) and Campbell and Viceira (2002)). The entrepreneurs,
rather than solving a maximization problem country by country, as in traditional trade
models, perform a global diversification strategy: they trade off the expected global profits
with their variance, the exact slope being governed by the absolute degree of risk aversion
γ > 0.
This implies that the firm’s entry decision in a market (that is, whether n > 0) does
not depend on amarket-specific productivity cutoff and, upon entry, firmsmay optimally
choose to reach only a fraction of consumers, rather than the entire market. This feature
stands in contrast with traditional trade models with fixed costs, such as Melitz (2003)
and Chaney (2008), and is consistent with the empirical evidence, as shown in Section 4.
Finally, since the pricing decision is made after the uncertainty is resolved, and con-
ditional on the number of consumers chosen in the first stage, the optimal price follows
a standard constant markup rule over the marginal cost, shown in equation (16). This
is because the realization of the shock in market j only shifts upward or downward the
demand curve without changing its slope, as shown in equation (5), and any realized
shock is absorbed by a change in the firm’s labor demand.24 In Appendix 8.1.2, I con-
sider an alternative production setting, in which also the pricing decision is made under
uncertainty, and show that the aggregate implications of the model are unchanged.
A limit case. It is worth looking at the optimal solution in the special case of risk
neutrality, i.e. γ = 0. In Appendix 8.1.4 I show that, in this case, a firm sells to country j
only if its productivity exceeds an entry cutoff:
(
z¯ij
)σ−1
=
wj f jLjP
1−σ
j σ
α¯j
(
σ
σ−1τijwi
)1−σ
Yj
, (17)
and that, whenever the firm enters a market, it sells to all consumers, so that nij(z) = 1.
This case is isomorphic (with α¯j = 1) to the firm’s optimal behavior in trade models
with risk-neutrality and fixed entry costs, such as Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). In
24A demand shock shifts up or down the quantity demanded, as shown in equation (5). This in turn
affects the demand for labor:
Li(z) = ∑
j
Ij(z)
qij(z)
z
=
1
z ∑
j
Ij(z)αj(z)
pij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
nij(z)Yj,
where Ij(z) equals 1 if firm z enters j. Intuitively, after learning the demand shocks, a firm can reallocate
resources toward destinations that had positive shocks, but it cannot i) either sell to countries in which it
did not make the marketing investment, ii) or change the number of consumers to sell to. Once firm-level
labor demand is aggregated in the labor market clearing condition, as shown below in equation (26), the
firm-level demand shocks are averaged out by the Law of Large Numbers.
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these models, firms enter all profitable locations, i.e. the markets where the revenues are
higher than the fixed costs of production, and upon entry they serve all consumers. The
case of γ = 0 constitutes an important benchmark, as I will compare the welfare impact
of counterfactual policies in my model with a positive risk aversion versus models with
risk neutrality.
2.3 Trade patterns
Proposition 1 implies that the sales of firm z to country j are given by:
xij(z) = pij(z)qij(z) = αj(z)
(
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
)1−σ
YjP
σ−1
j nij(z). (18)
Equation (18) suggests that the unobserved demand shocks αj(z) can be structurally re-
covered from the observed firm-level trade flows, upon controlling for the other determi-
nants of trade flows that appear in equation (18). In Section 3, I will use this feature of the
model to back out the demand shocks and estimate their moments.
I now investigate how trade patterns are affected by risk. To this end, I define the
following ex-ante measure of risk:
Definition 1. Given a covariance matrix Σ and a vector of expected values α¯, the Diversification
Index is defined as
D ≡ Σ−1α¯. (19)
The Diversification Index is an ex-ante measure of risk at the country-level. For example,
with two symmetric countries, it simply equals:
D =
α¯
σ2(1+ ρ)
, (20)
where σ2 and α¯ denote the variance and the mean of the demand shocks, respectively,
and ρ is the cross-country correlation. Equation (20) shows that the Diversification Index
is increasing in the mean, decreasing in the variance, and decreasing in the correlation of
demand with the other country. It is easy to verify that the same holds for the general
case with N countries in equation (19). Therefore the Diversification Index summarizes
the ex-ante diversification benefits that a country provides to firms selling there, since it
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is inversely proportional to the overall riskiness of its demand.25
At this stage, it is useful to define the auxiliary matrix A:
Definition 2. Given a covariance matrix Σ, the cofactor matrix associated with Σ has elements
equal to Ckj ≡ (−1)k+jMkj, where Mkj is the (k, j) minor of Σ. Define A the matrix whose i, j
element equals Aij ≡ −∑k 6=i CikΣkj for i 6= j, and Aij = 1 for i = j.
Recall also the definition of an M-matrix (see Berman and Plemmons (1994)):
Definition 3. A matrix A is an M-matrix if and only if: i) the off-diagonal entries are less than
or equal to zero, ii) A is nonsingular, iii) A−1 is nonnegative.
In the following Proposition, I characterize how trade patterns depend on the Diver-
sification Index in partial equilibrium, i.e. holding constant aggregate prices and wages:
Proposition 2. If A is a M-matrix, then the probability of exporting and the amount exported to
a market are increasing in its Diversification Index.
Proposition 2 suggests that risk affects trade patterns not only through the mean and
variance of profits, but through the multilateral covariance summarized by D, i.e. how
much the demand in a market co-varies with demand in all other countries. The sufficient
condition to have a positive effect of the Diversification Index on nij(z) is A to be a M-
matrix, i.e. all off-diagonal elements of A must be negative. It is easy to verify that A
is a M-matrix whenever some demand covariances are negative.26 Intuitively, the pattern
of demand covariances across countries has to give enough diversification benefits in
order for firms to engage in international trade. This will turn out to be important also in
shaping the welfare gains from trade, as discussed in Proposition 5.
Propositions 1 and 2 highlight that firms may optimally reach only few consumers in
a given market, and thus export small amounts. This stands in contrast with trade mod-
els with fixed costs, such as Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008), which require large fixed
25TheDiversification Index can be seen as a generalization of the Sharpe Ratio typically used in finance to
rank assets by their riskiness (see Sharpe (1966)). In fact, in the limit case in which all demand correlations
are zero, the Diversification Index equals the simple ratio between mean and variance, similarly to the
Sharpe Ratio, which is computed as an asset’s “excess average return” divided by its standard deviation.
26This can be seen, for example, for the case N = 4, where a typical element of the matrix A is:
A21 = ρ12σ
3
1σ2σ
2
3σ
2
4 (1− ρ213 − ρ214 − ρ234 + 2ρ13ρ14ρ34).
where ρij is the demand correlation between j and i, and σi is the standard deviation of i. Then, to have
A21 < 0, at least one correlation must be negative.
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costs to explain firm entry patterns, contradicting the existence of many small exporters
observed in the data. In the empirical section, I will use this feature to test the model’s fit
to the data.
Having characterized the exporting behavior of risk averse firms, I now define the
world equilibrium and discuss its properties.
2.4 General equilibrium
I now describe the equations that define the trade equilibrium of themodel. Following
Helpman et al. (2004), Chaney (2008) and Arkolakis et al. (2008), I assume that the produc-
tivities are drawn, independently across firms and countries, from a Pareto distribution
with density:
g(z) = θz−θ−1, z ≥ z, (21)
where z > 0. Aggregate trade flows from i to j are:
Xij = Mi
∫ ∞
z
α¯jpij(z)
1−σ Yj
P1−σj
nij(z)g(z)dz. (22)
The price index is:
P1−σi = ∑
j
Mj
∫ ∞
z
α¯inji(z)pji(z)
1−σg(z)dz, (23)
where nji(z) and pji(z) are shown in Proposition 1.
27 Since the optimal fraction of con-
sumers reached, nij(z), is bounded between 0 and 1, a sufficient condition to have a finite
integral is that θ > σ− 1, as also discussed in Section 2.6. As in Chaney (2008), the number
of firms is fixed to Mi, implying that in equilibrium there are profits, which equal:
28
Πi = Mi ∑
j
(
1
σ
∫ ∞
z
α¯jpij(z)
1−σYjPσ−1j nij(z)g(z)dz−
∫ ∞
z
fij(z)g(z)dz
)
. (24)
I impose a balanced current account, thus the total expenditures in each country must
equal to labor income plus business profits:
27The assumption that the demand shocks are i.i.d. across varieties implies that, in (23), α¯i = α¯i(z) ≡∫ ∞
0 αi(z)hi(α)dα.
28Note that, even in a model with free-entry of firms, there are profits in equilibrium, because en-
trepreneurs need to be compensated for taking on business risk. See Appendix 8.1.10 for details.
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∑
k
Xki ≡ Yi = wi L˜i + Πi. (25)
Finally, the labor market clearing condition states that in each country the supply of labor
must equal the amount of labor used for production andmarketing (paid by foreign firms
exporting to the domestic country):
Mi ∑
j
∫ ∞
z
τij
z
α¯jpij(z)
−σYjPσ−1j nij(z)g(z)dz+ ∑
j
Mj
∫ ∞
z
finji(z)Lig(z)dz = L˜i, (26)
The trade equilibrium in this economy is characterized by a vector of wages {wi}, price
indexes {Pi} and income {Yi} that solve the system of equations (23), (25), (26), where nij
is given by equation (15).29
2.5 Welfare gains from trade
I define welfare in country i as the equally-weighted sum of the welfare of workers
and entrepreneurs. Since workers maximize a CES utility, their welfare is simply the real
wage wiPi , as in ACR. In contrast, the entrepreneurs’ indirect utility is given by equation
(3).30 Then, aggregate welfare equals:
Wi =
wi L˜i
Pi
+
Πi
Pi
− R˜i, (27)
where R˜i ≡ Mi
∫ ∞
z
γ
2Var
(
pii(z)
Pi
)
dG(z) is the aggregate “risk premium”.
A limit case. As shown earlier, when the risk aversion is zero the firm optimal behavior
is the same as in standard monopolistic competition models, as Melitz (2003). It is easy to
show that, in the special case of γ = 0, the welfare gains after a reduction in trade costs
from τ to τ′ are given by:
lnWˆi|γ=0 = −1θ lnλˆii (28)
where xˆ ≡ x′x , λii denotes the domestic trade share in country i and θ equals the trade
elasticity. As shown by ACR, several trade models predict the welfare gains from trade
29Given the analytical complexity of the firm problem, finding sufficient conditions that guarantee the
uniqueness of the equilibrium is difficult. However, when solved numerically, the model does not display
the occurrence of multiple equilibria.
30This also corresponds to the Certainty Equivalent, the correct money-metricmeasure of welfare in pres-
ence of uncertainty (see Pratt (1964) and Pope et al. (1983)).
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to be equal to equation (28), such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003), Arkolakis
et al. (2008) and Chaney (2008). Therefore, the case of γ = 0 provides the theoretical
benchmark to study how departures from risk-neutrality affect the welfare gains from
trade liberalization.
2.6 Two symmetric countries
To illustrate some properties of the model and to obtain a closed-form expression for
the welfare gains from trade, I study the special case where there are two perfectly sym-
metric countries, home and foreign. Define α¯ to be the expected value of the demand
shock, Var(α) its variance and ρ the cross-country correlation of shocks. For simplicity, I
assume that α¯ = Var(α) = 1, and I also set z = 1. I consider two opposite equilibria: one
in which there is autarky, and one in which there is free trade, so τij = 1 for all i and j.
31
2.6.1 The firm problem
Under autarky, the Diversification Index is simply the ratio between the mean and the
variance of the demand shocks:
DA =
α¯
Var(α)
= 1. (29)
Instead, under free trade the Diversification Index is
D =
α¯
Var(α) (1+ ρ)
=
1
1+ ρ
. (30)
Notice that the Diversification Index is decreasing in the cross-country correlation of de-
mand: the larger this correlation, then the smaller the diversification benefits from selling
abroad.
In Appendix 8.1, I show that in both equilibria the firm’s optimal solution is:
Proposition 3. The unique optimal n(z) satisfies:
31Throughout this sub-section I assume that γ > γ˜ (where γ˜ depends only on parameters), so that
n(z) < 1 always for all z. This eliminates the multiplier of the upper bound. Intuitively, if the entrepreneurs
are sufficiently risk averse, they always prefer to not reach all consumers. See Appendix 8.1.5 for more
details.
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n(z) = 0 if z ≤ z∗
n(z) =
D
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
if z > z∗
where r(z) are real gross profits, as in equation (12), and the entry cutoff is:
z∗ =
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 f P1−σσ
α¯Y
) 1
σ−1
. (31)
In both equilibria, the Diversification Index is a sufficient statistics for risk in the en-
trepreneur’s optimal decision.32 Under free trade, D is decreasing in the cross-country
correlation of demand: the more correlated is demand with the foreign country, the
“riskier” the world and thus the lower the number of consumers reached. The existence
of a single entry cutoff means that there is strict sorting of firms into markets, as in Melitz
(2003). However, that happens only because of the perfect symmetry between the two
countries, which implies that n(z) is not affected by the Lagrange multipliers of the other
location. In the general case of N asymmetric countries, firms do not strictly sort into
foreign markets, as explained in the previous section.
2.6.2 The effect of free trade on risk diversification
I now study the effects of going from autarky to a free trade equilibrium with a sym-
metric country. I first investigate how free trade affects the risk-return profile of each
firm. In order to evaluate the level of risk diversification attained by each firm, I follow
the finance literature (see e.g. Cochrane (2009)) and compute the Sharpe Ratio, i.e. the
mean/standard deviation ratio of real profits:
SR(z) =
E
(
pi(z)
P
)
Std
(
pi(z)
P
) . (32)
32The perfect symmetry and the absence of trade costs imply that any firm will choose the same n(z) in
both the domestic and foreign market. This means that either a firm enters in both countries, or in neither
of the two. This feature is the reason why perfect symmetry and free trade is the only case in which I
can derive an analytical expression for n(z). If there were trade costs τij > 1, the optimal n(z) would still
depend on the Lagrange multiplier of the other destination.
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Intuitively, the higher this ratio, the higher are expected real profits of firm z relative
to their volatility, proxied by their standard deviation, and therefore the better the risk-
return profile of the firm.33 In the following proposition, I characterize how the firm-level
Sharpe Ratio changes from autarky to free trade in general equilibrium:34
Proposition 4. In going from autarky to free-trade:
i) Conditional on surviving, the percentage change in the Sharpe Ratio of firm z is:
SˆR(z) =
(
2
1+ ρ
) 1
2
(
1− (1+ ρ)− σ−1θ+1 (2) σ−1θ+1 ψ (z)1−σ
)
(
1− (z)1−σ ψ
) − 1 (33)
where ψ ≡ γ 1−σθ+1 M σ−1θ+1 (L˜) −σ(1+θ) f 1+θ σ˜ and σ˜ > 0 depends only on σ and θ.
ii) The change in the Sharpe Ratio is always increasing in z, while the effect of ρ is ambiguous.
Equation (33) highlights three effects of free trade on the ex-post Sharpe ratio. First,
there is a direct diversification effect given by
(
2
1+ρ
) 1
2
: free trade increases SR(z) since
entrepreneurs can hedge domestic risk by exporting to the foreign country. Second, there
is a competition effect, given by (2)
σ−1
θ+1 : free trade implies more competition among firms
and thus lower prices, which translates into a higher entry cutoff, lower expected profits
and a lower SR(z). Third, there is an indirect diversification effect, given by (1+ ρ)−
σ−1
θ+1 :
a higher correlation of demand lowers n(z), from Proposition 3, which dampens the com-
petition effect of trade on prices, implying a smaller increase in the entry cutoff and an
increase in the Sharpe Ratio.
This discussion suggests that, while a lower demand correlation improves the risk-
return profile of a firm through the direct diversification effect, the indirect effect that
works through the price index and the entry cutoff may actually lower the Sharpe Ratio.
When the competition effect is stronger, i.e. ψ is high (e.g. when L˜ is small or M is
high), free trade can actually backfire and lower the ex-post Sharpe Ratio. In other words,
conditional on surviving (i.e. n(z) > 0 under both autarky and free trade), real profits
may decrease by more than the reduction in their volatility. Not surprisingly, this is more
likely to happen to smaller firms, as the Sharpe Ratio is strictly increasing in the firm
productivity.
33Note the difference between evaluating the ex-ante riskiness of a set of potential destinations, for which
one should take into account for the full covariance structure, as in equation (19), and evaluating the ex-post
riskiness of a portfolio, as in equation (32).
34Equations (80)-(81) and (89)-(90) in Appendix (8.1) solve for the equilibrium endogenous variables in
both autarky and free trade. I use that result to incorporate the general equilibrium response of prices to
free trade into the Sharpe Ratio of the firms.
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2.6.3 Welfare gains from trade
I now characterize the effect of free trade on aggregate welfare. Recall from equation
(27) that welfare can be written as real income minus the aggregate risk premium. In the
Appendix I prove the following result:
Proposition 5. Welfare gains of going from autarky to free trade are given by:
lnWˆi = lnWˆi|γ=0· θθ + 1 −
1
θ + 1
ln (1+ ρ) (34)
Therefore, welfare gains are higher than in a risk neutral model if and only if ρ < (2)−
1
θ − 1.
Proposition 5 shows that free trade has three distinct effects on welfare.35 The first
is given by the reduction in the price index due to more competition from foreign firms,
the standard channel present in trade models with risk neutrality, i.e. ACR. Since with
autarky the trade share is 1, with two symmetric countries lnWˆi|γ=0 simply equals 12 . The
second effect, given by 1θ+1 ln (1+ ρ), is the general equilibrium counterpart of the direct
diversification effect highlighted in Proposition 4. When the correlation of demand with
the foreign country is low, firms increase their exports in order to hedge their domestic
demand risk, according to Proposition 3. This implies tougher competition among firms,
which leads to lower prices and higher welfare gains. The third channel, given by θθ+1 ,
dampens the competition effect of trade on welfare. Lower prices induced by free trade
increase the expected real profits, but also their variance, generating a feedback effect
that lowers the number of consumers reached by the firms, reducing the competition and
increasing the price index.
The combination of these general equilibrium effects implies that my model predicts
larger welfare gains from trade than models with risk neutral firms as long as the corre-
lation of demand is sufficiently low. For example, setting θ = 5, a typical value for this
parameter, welfare gains in my model are higher than in ACR as long as ρ > −0.13.36
35Note that both the risk aversion and the mean and variance of the shocks do not affect the welfare
gains from trade only because of the perfect symmetry assumed between the two countries. In the general
case, they do affect the gains, as shown in Section 5.
36In Appendix 8.1.10, I also solve an extension of the model that allows for free entry of firms, similarly
to Melitz (2003). Since entrepreneurs are risk-averse, they enter until the expected utility of running a firm
equals a fixed entry cost. In such setting, the gains from variety brought by the change in the number of
entrants push the aggregate welfare gains up and higher than in the model with fixed entry. Specifically,
the welfare gains equal lnWˆ = lnWˆi|γ=0 − 1θ ln (1+ ρ), which are higher than in Proposition 5 since |ρ| < 1.
Therefore, also with free-entry the welfare gains from trade are higher than in ACR as long as the demand
correlation is sufficiently low.
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To sum up, the theoretical results discussed in this section highlight the importance
of the sign and magnitude of the cross-country covariance of demand in shaping i) the
direction of trade flows, ii) the risk diversification benefits of international trade, and iii)
the welfare gains from trade. Therefore, the estimation of the covariance matrix of de-
mand is crucial for the quantification of the effective benefits of international trade on
risk diversification and welfare. To this end, in the following section I develop a method-
ology to estimate the first and second ordermoments of the demand shocks, whichwill be
used, together with the other parameters, to assess the relevance of the risk diversification
channel in Section 5.
3 Estimation
The analysis mostly relies on a panel dataset on domestic and international sales of Por-
tuguese firms to 210 countries, between 1995 and 2005. These data come from Statistics
Portugal and roughly aggregate to the official total exports of Portugal. I merged this
dataset with data on some firm characteristics, such as number of employees, total sales
and equity, which I extracted from a matched employer–employee panel dataset called
Quadros de Pessoal. I also merged the trade data with another dataset, called Central
de Balancos, containing balance sheet information, for all Portuguese firms from 1995 to
2005.37 I also use data on manufacturing trade flows from the UN Comtrade database as
the empirical counterpart of aggregate bilateral trade in the model, complemented with
data on manufacturing production from WIOD and UNIDO (see Dietzenbacher et al.
(2013)), all for 2005.38
From the Portuguese trade dataset, I consider the 10,934 manufacturing firms that,
between 1995 to 2005, were selling domestically and exporting to at least one of the top
34 destinations served by Portugal.39 Trade flows to these countries accounted for 90.56%
of total manufacturing exports from Portugal in 2005. I exclude from the analysis foreign
firms’ affiliates, i.e. firms operating in Portugal but owned by foreign owners, since their
exporting decision is most likely affected by their parent’s optimal strategy. The universe
of Portuguese manufacturing exporters is comprised of mostly small firms, the average
number of destinations served was 5 in 2005, and the average export share was 30%.
37I describe these datasets in more detail in Appendix 8.2.
38I use data on bilateral trade flows and domestic sales from the TradeProd database assembled by CEPII.
See De Sousa et al. (2012).
39I first select the top 45 destinations from Portugal by value of exports, and then I keep the countries for
which there is data on manufacturing production, in order to construct bilateral trade flows. The remaining
set consists of 34 countries. See the list of countries in Table 3 in Appendix 8.2.
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3.1 Estimation of the Diversification Index
The first step of the empirical analysis is to estimate the country-level measure of risk,
the Diversification Index, which requires estimating the means and covariance matrix of
the demand shocks. I use the years 1995-2004 to estimate these moments. This follows
a long tradition in empirical finance that uses historical data to identify the moments of
risky assets (see e.g. Cochrane (2009)), and a recent empirical literature that identifies
demand shocks as innovations from the growth rate of sales (see e.g. Di Giovanni et al.
(2014)). Using time-series variation of firms’ sales also enhances the power of the esti-
mation, resulting in tighter confidence intervals of the point estimates. I then treat the
sample means and covariances of the estimated shocks as estimates of the corresponding
population moments, which firms take as given when they choose their risk diversifica-
tion strategy in 2005.
The estimation of the moments of the demand shocks entails two steps. First, I use
the firm-destination level equation for sales to recover the unobserved demand shocks in
each year of the sample. Then I use these shocks to compute the means and covariance
matrix of demand across countries. For brevity, I define the variables x˜ ≡ ln (x) and
∆x ≡ xt − xt−1.
3.1.1 Step 1: Identification of demand shocks
I assume that the structural model in Section 2 is the Data Generating Process:
Assumption 4a In every year t of the sample period, the world economy is generated by the
model of Section 2, and all parameters are constant throughout the sample period.
Assumption 4a and equation (18) imply that, in every year t, the log-sales of Por-
tuguese firm s to country j (including Portugal itself) can be written as:
x˜tjs = δ
t + δts + δ
t
j + ε
t
js (35)
where δt ≡ (1− σ)ln ( σσ−1w), δts ≡ (σ − 1)ln(zs), δtj ≡ (1− σ)ln (τtj )+ ln
(
Ytj
Pt1−σj
)
, and
εtjs = α˜
t
js + n˜
t
js. (36)
Under Assumption 4a, and the fact that n˜tjs does not depend on the realization of the
shocks as shown in Proposition 1, taking a first-difference across time eliminates n˜tjs:
εtjs − εt−1js = α˜tjs + n˜tjs − α˜t−1js − n˜t−1js = ∆α˜tjs (37)
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Lastly, Assumption 3b, i.e. the orthogonality between firm-level productivity and de-
mand shocks, implies that I can estimate the structural sales equation as a fixed-effect
OLS regression:
∆x˜tjs = δ
t
s + δ
t
j + Z
t
js
′β + ηtjs (38)
where Ztjs is a set of firm-destination specific variables. The structural specification
in (38) controls for firm-specific productivity shocks that are common to all destinations,
by means of the firm fixed-effect, and by destination-specific characteristics, such as trade
costs and real income, bymeans of the destination fixed effect. Accordingly, the structural
residual ηtjs in equation (38) identifies ∆α˜
t
js, the log-change in demand shocks. Effectively,
this approach identifies demand shocks as innovations from the growth rate of domestic
and international sales, similarly to Gabaix (2011), Castro et al. (2010) and Di Giovanni
et al. (2014).
The vector Ztjs includes log changes in firm-year-specific investment, capital intensity,
and productivity (proxied by revenues per worker), all interacted with country-specific
dummies.40 Including the firms’ investment rates and capital intensity controls for the
possibility that firms endogenously respond to demand shocks in a market by chang-
ing their capital structure, as highlighted in Friedrich et al. (2018), thus affecting ∆x˜tjs.
41
Controlling for the firm productivity interacted with country dummies accounts for the
evidence, shown in Mayer et al. (2016), that foreign demand shocks may induce changes
in firms’ productivity, thus affecting sales.
Lastly, note that the specification in (38) controls for some features of the firms’ be-
havior that the model does not capture explicitly. In fact, the firm and destination fixed
effects control for endogenous markups (see De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)), while
the first differencing absorbs the time-invariant component of pricing-to-market, which
is firm-destination specific, and any time-invariant trade costs that are firm-destination
specific.42
40These are the variables that have the best coverage across the firms’ balance sheets from the Central
de Balancos dataset. Given the dimensionality of the data, replacing Ztjs with an interaction of fixed effects
would not be computationally feasible.
41Note that adding investment interactedwith destination dummies should also control for the spending
in marketing and distributional activities that exporters make in order to learn the demand in each market.
While in principle these should be absorbed, given Assumption 4a, by the year-to-year first difference, any
time-varying component of that may affect sales. Using investment data at the firm level is an imperfect
proxy for these expenditures, but is the best I can do given the data availability.
42De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) show that, in a very general environment, markups can be written
as a function of destination-level revenue shares and industry-level output elasticity. In logs, these are
absorbed in the destination and firm fixed effects.
25
3.1.2 Step 2: Estimation of α¯ and Σ
Once the demand shocks are structurally recovered, in order to estimate the covariance
matrix I make the following identifying assumption.
Assumption 4b Demand shocks are independently and identically distributed across firms and
time.
The i.i.d assumption is useful because it allows to exploit both time-series and cross-
sectional variation in the residuals. Since firms independently draw the shocks from the
same distribution, to compute the covariance matrix of the log-changes of the shocks, for
every pair of destinations j and k, I stack the residuals ηˆtjs and ηˆ
t
ks for each Portuguese
firm s that was selling to both markets j and k in year t. Effectively, each firm-year pair is
a vector of (at most) N correlated demand shocks draws. I compute an unbiased estimate
of the covariance between country j and k as:
Cov
(
∆α˜j,∆α˜k
)
=
1
Sjk − 1
Sjk
∑
s=1
(
ηˆjs − η¯j
)
(ηˆks − η¯k) (39)
where ηˆks and ηˆjs are the residuals from equation (35), Sjk is the number of observations
(total number of firms-year pairs that sell to both markets j and k) and η¯i ≡ 1Sjk ∑
Sjk
s=1 ηˆis
for all i.
Note that, since the expectation and the covariance are linear operators, an alternative
approach would be to compute the covariances for each Portuguese exporter using only
time-series variation, and then, for each bilateral pair, compute the average covariance
across firms (see Appendix 8.1.12 for a proof). In the robustness section, I show that the
resulting point estimates are indeed very similar.43
To compute the covariance matrix of the log of the shocks, I use the assumption that
the shocks are i.i.d. across time to obtain (see Appendix 8.1.11 for the proof):
Σ˜jk ≡ Cov
(
α˜j, α˜k
)
= Cov
(
∆α˜j,∆α˜k
)
/2. (40)
Finally, in order to recover the covariancematrix from the covariance of the log shocks,
Σ˜jk, I have to make a functional form assumption about the distribution of the demand
shocks:44
43However, since the number of years is much smaller than the number of Portuguese exporters selling
to each bilateral pair, such alternative approach lowers the degrees of freedom and inflates the standard
errors.
44The need to make a functional form assumption on the distribution of the shocks arises from the fact
that I recover the growth rates of the demand shocks, and not directly their levels. If I were to estimate the
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Assumption 4c Demand shocks are distributed as
logα(z) ∼ N (0, Σ˜)
The log-normality assumption has been traditionally used in empirical asset pricing
to model asset returns (see Singleton (2006) and Cochrane (2009)), but recently also in
the quantitative trade literature to model demand shocks (see Eaton et al. (2011), Nguyen
(2012) and Crozet et al. (2012)), for its tractability and because it has a positive domain
(demand shocks cannot be negative).45
Using the properties of the normal distribution, I obtain the covariance of the level of
the shocks as:
Σjk ≡ Cov
(
αj, αk
)
= exp
(
1
2
(
Var
(
α˜j
)
+Var (α˜k)
)) [
exp
(
Cov
(
α˜j, α˜k
))− 1] (41)
for all j and k, and the expected value as:
α¯k ≡ E [αk] = exp
(
1
2
Var (α˜k)
)
(42)
for all k.
3.1.3 Results and descriptive statistics
I implement the estimation methodology described above using data on Portuguese firm-
level domestic and international sales from 1995 to 2004. Given the several fixed effects
and interaction terms, I do not report the results of the regressions for brevity, but it is
interesting to note that the R2 is around 0.5. This suggests that 50% of the variation in
firms sales is driven by firm-destination demand shocks, a striking number but in line
with the existing empirical evidence (see e.g. Eaton et al. (2011), Di Giovanni et al. (2014)
and Hottman et al. (2015)).
Table 1 reports some summary statistics on the estimated moments and their boot-
strapped standard errors, while Figure 2 plots the distribution of the estimated covari-
structural equations for sales in levels, I could not identify the demand shocks separately from n˜tjs.
45Note that in the data I cannot back out the mean of α˜j, because I only observe the residuals ε js, and
ε js = α˜js + n˜js. For this reason, I impose E
[
α˜j
]
= 0 in Assumption 4d. However, as shown in equation (42),
the mean of αj is not equal to zero.
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ances.46 The covariances range from -1.73 to 2.49, with a median of -0.04, while variances
are typically larger, and standard errors are quite small. Such vast heterogeneity in the
variance and covariances across countries suggests the potential for risk diversification.
In fact, Table 2 documents that more remote destinations offer better risk diversification
benefits, since bilateral demand covariances are significantly negatively correlated with
bilateral distance. This highlights the trade-off that exporters face. On one hand, the tra-
ditional profit maximization motive gives firms incentives to sell to nearby or “similar”
destinations, because of lower trade costs. On the other hand, the risk minimization mo-
tive gives firms incentives to sell to remote countries, which could hedge against domestic
fluctuations in demand.
Using the estimated Σ and α¯, I compute the country-level Diversification Index, using
equation (19). Table 3 reports the Diversification Indexes for the countries in the sample,
together with their bootstrapped standard errors. Column 1 in Table 4 instead reports
some summary statistics. Standard errors are relatively small, suggesting that the Di-
versification Indexes are quite precisely estimated. Figure 3 shows that countries with
a lower GDP per capita in 2005 had a lower Diversification index, consistent with evi-
dence in Koren and Tenreyro (2007) that poorer countries are typically riskier than richer
countries.
3.1.4 Robustness
I now examine the robustness of the estimates to some of the assumptions made for the
empirical methodology just described, and show that they do not significantly affect the
results.
No supply shocks. I first investigate how controlling for the firm-destination supply
shocks affects the estimates. Since data on capital intensity and investment rates is miss-
ing for some firms in the sample, the baseline approach could generate a selection bias.
To this end, I re-estimate equation (38) without the controls Ztjs, and compute the Diver-
sification Index as explained above. Reassuringly, Figure 4 documents that omitting the
controls for supply shocks does not significantly alter the estimated Diversification Index.
Firm-level covariances. As discussed in the previous section, an alternative approach
would be to compute the covariances for each Portuguese exporter using only time-series
variation, and then, for each bilateral pair, compute the average covariance across firms.
46Specifically, for each iteration, I sample with replacement for each pair of countries from the existing
structurally recovered demand shocks and use the steps shown in the previous section to compute the
covariance matrix (and the Diversification Index). I repeat this procedure 1,000 times and compute the
standard deviation.
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Figure 4 highlights that such approach would produce a Diversification Index that is
highly correlated with the baseline one.47
Aggregate shocks. The empirical methodology described above rules out the pres-
ence of country-specific demand shocks, such as a monetary tightening or exchange rate
fluctuations, that affect the sales of all exporters to a certain destination. As discussed
in Section 2, introducing aggregate shocks would significantly complicate the computa-
tional effort needed to solve the model. However, here I empirically investigate whether
allowing for aggregate shocks substantially alters the riskiness of a country. In Appendix
8.1.13, I show how to use the structural equation (38) to back out aggregate shocks. Figure
4 shows that the baseline DI and the one augmented with macro shocks are highly corre-
lated. Therefore, while macro shocks are certainly an important component of the overall
demand that exporters face, the baseline setting seems to be a good approximation of the
demand risk faced by exporters.48
Learning. There is evidence that, in the short run, firms sequentially enter different
markets to learn their demand behavior, and often exit very soon (see Albornoz et al.
(2012), Ruhl and Willis (2014) and Berman et al. (2015b) among others). This short-run
learning behavior may contaminate the estimation of the moments. For this reason, I re-
estimate the moments of the distribution considering only “established” firm-destination
pairs, i.e. exporters selling to a certain market for at least 5 years, for which the learning
process is most likely over. Figure 4 shows that using only established firm-destination
pairs does not significantly affect the estimates.49
Sectoral covariances. In order to maximize the number of observations used to com-
pute the moments, and therefore enhance the precision of the estimates, I have assumed
that the distribution of the shocks is the same for all sectors. However, this assumption
may be too restrictive. To compromise between the level of disaggregation and the credi-
bility of the estimates, I compute the moments of the distribution separately for 7 manu-
facturing sectors.50 Columns 2-8 in Table 4 report some summary statistics, showing the
47Using this approach, however, leads to higher standard errors, since each firm-level covariance is
computed with fewer observations. This is the reason why I do not use these estimates as baseline.
48This result is consistent with the recent empirical evidence that firm-destination specific shocks, rather
than aggregate shocks, account for a large fraction of the variation in firms’ sales across countries (see e.g.
Di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Hottman et al. (2015)).
49On one hand, having at least 5 years of observations for each firm-destination pair allows to have more
accurate estimates of the moments of the distribution. On the other hand, this approach selects firms that
have most likely faced positive demand shocks, generating a selection bias. Sales by established exporters
represent 89% of total exports volume throughout the sample period.
50Specifically, I assign each Portuguese firm to a given sector based on the main product the firm pro-
duces. The sectors are: Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textile Products; Wood and Products of Wood and
Cork; Non-Metallic Minerals; Metals; Machinery; Others.
29
heterogeneity of the riskiness across sectors and the larger magnitude of the bootstrapped
standard errors.51
3.2 Estimation of risk aversion
To estimate the firms’ risk aversion, I follow Allen and Atkin (2016) and directly use the
firms’ first order conditions. For simplicity, I assume that marketing costs are sufficiently
high so that there is no Portuguese firm selling to the totality of consumers in any country,
implying that µj(z) = 0 for all j and z.
52 For each destination j where firm z is selling to
(and thus for which λj(z) = 0), the FOC can be written as:
α¯jrj(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected gross profits
= wj f jLj/P︸ ︷︷ ︸
marketing cost
+ γ ∑
s
rj(z)ns(z)rs(z)Cov(αj, αs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal variance of gross profits
(43)
where the left hand side is the marginal expected benefit of adding one additional con-
sumer in country j, while the right hand side is its marginal cost, which is the sum of the
marketing costs plus the marginal variance. The intuition for equation (43) is that the risk
aversion regulates the slope of the relationship between themarginal expected profits and
their marginal variance. The higher γ, the more entrepreneurs want to be compensated
for taking additional risk, and thus higher marginal variance of profits must be associated
with higher marginal expected profits.
I exploit this relationship to identify the risk aversion in the data. In Appendix 8.1.14,
I show how to recover the unobserved marginal moments from the observed actual mo-
ments of gross profits, without requiring any further assumption. Then I can write equa-
tion (43) as a fixed-effect OLS regression:
MargE[GrossPro f itsjz] = dj + γ MargVar[GrossPro f itsjz] + ε jz (44)
where dj ≡ wj f jLj/P is a destination fixed effect that controls for country-specific mar-
keting costs, and where ε jz is not a structural residual, but simple econometric error.
51In addition, the sparsity of the firm-country trade matrix implies that, for some country pairs within a
sector, there is no Portuguese firm selling to both markets. In such cases, I set the covariance to be the same
as the corresponding aggregate covariance computed in the baseline. The presence of missing covariances,
together with less precise estimates, is the reason why I do not use sectoral covariances in the baseline.
52 Given the median size of Portuguese firms, this seems a reasonable assumption.
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I use data on observed gross profits of Portuguese firms from 1995 to 2004 to compute
the variables in equation (44), which is then implemented with an OLS regression. The
regression is weighted by firms’ total sales in 2005, both to minimize the influence of
outliers and to estimate the appropriate average effect for the counterfactual analysis.
Table 5, Column 1, shows that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship
between the expected marginal profits and their variance, with a risk-aversion parameter
of 0.41. The point estimate is a bit lower - 0.28 - if I exclude domestic sales (Column 2),
and it remains the same if the sample includes only established exporters (Column 3).53
It is important to note that the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter per se is not
sufficient to assess the level of risk aversion of firms. Instead, it is appropriate to look at
the implied risk premium, which expresses the risk aversion in relation to the magnitude
of the risk taken, i.e. the so-called “size of the gamble”. For a CARA utility, the risk
premium, expressed as percentage of the size of the gamble, can be approximated as
φ ≈ ln(0.5(e
−γg + eγg))
γg
(45)
where γ is the risk aversion and g is the size of the gamble.54 Following the empirical lit-
erature, I proxy g by the standard deviation of firm sales. Then, a risk aversion coefficient
of 0.41 implies an average risk premium of φ = 74%, which suggests a high level of risk
aversion for exporters.55
3.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model in the year 2005. For the full calibration, I introduce a non-tradeable
good produced, under perfect competition, with labor and unitary productivity. Con-
sumers spend a constant share ξ of their income on the manufacturing tradeable goods,
and a share 1 − ξ on the non-tradeable good. I assume that the demand for the non-
tradeable good is non-stochastic. I set ξ = 0.23, which is the median value of the con-
sumption shares on manufacturing estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2014).
53This number is in the same ballpark of the estimate provided in Allen and Atkin (2016), which use the
returns of crops to estimate Indian farmers’ risk aversion.
54In other words, the risk premium is the fraction of the potential loss in a gamble that an agent is willing
to pay to avoid facing that gamble. See Babcock et al. (1993) for a discussion.
55Note that if firms hedged profits fluctuations with financial derivatives, they would be able to reduce
the volatility of their cash-flows, implying an upward bias for the risk aversion. However, this concern
is mitigated by the evidence that hedging practices are not widespread among Portuguese firms (see Iyer
et al. (2014)), and by the fact that the sample is composed mostly by small firms, whose access to financial
markets is limited (see Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011)).
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I set the elasticity of substitution to σ = 4, consistent with estimates of an average
mark-up of 33% in the manufacturing sector (see Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012)
and Broda and Weinstein (2006)). I set the technology parameter θ to 5, which is around
the value found by a large empirical literature (seeHead andMayer (2013) and Simonovska
andWaugh (2014)). I proxy L˜j with the total number of workers in the manufacturing sec-
tor, while Mj is the total number of manufacturing firms, both from UNIDO.
I follow Arkolakis (2010) and assume that the cost to reach a certain number of con-
sumers is lower in markets with a larger population, so the per-consumer cost equals:
f j = L
α−1
j . (46)
I set α = 0.42, as calibrated in Arkolakis (2010).
Finally, I calibrate the matrix of trade costs in order to match the observedmatrix of in-
ternational trade shares in the manufacturing sector. Appendix 8.3 describes in detail the
Simulated Method of Moments algorithm used. Figure 5 shows that the model correctly
reproduces the heterogeneity in trade shares that we observe in the data in 2005.
Since the model reasonably matches the amount of trade observed in the data, I can
compute the fraction of trade flows that is explained by risk diversification. To this end,
I set the risk aversion to zero and, holding constant the other parameters, I compute the
predicted trade shares, λNij . Then, 1 minus the R
2 of a regression of the calibrated trade
shares on λNij represents the fraction of variation in the trade flows explained by risk
diversification.56 Figure 6 plots λNij against the calibrated trade shares, and the associated
R2 of 0.85 suggests that risk diversification explains 15% of the observed trade flows.
4 Testing the model predictions
Armed with the estimated Diversification Index, I first perform reduced-form tests to
investigate whether the predictions of the model hold in the data. In particular, I run a
set of “risk-augmented” gravity regressions at the firm and country level. Then, I use the
fully calibrated model to perform a structural test of the model predictions.
56Using the actual trades shares or the calibrated ones does not make a difference, since the R2 between
them is 0.996.
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4.1 Reduced-form evidence
Firm-level extensive margin. Proposition 2 states that the probability that a firm enters a
market, i.e. that nij(z) > 0, is increasing in the market’s Diversification Index, conditional
on trade barriers and country characteristics. To test this prediction, I run the following
“gravity” regression:
Pr
(
xsj > 0
)
= β0 + δs + X
′
jβ1 + β2ln
(
Dj
)
+ ε js, (47)
where xsj are the sales of Portuguese firm s to foreign country j in 2005, δs is a firm fixed
effect, Xj is a set of destination-specific controls, which include standard gravity variables,
as well as log of GDP, log of population, an index of remoteness that proxies for multilat-
eral resistance (as in Bravo-Ortega and Giovanni (2006) and Frankel and Romer (1999)),
and trade openness.57 Standard errors are clustered at the country level, to control for
unobserved correlation across firms within a destination. All regressions are weighted by
firms total sales in 2005, to minimize the influence of outliers.
Column 1 in Table 6 shows that, as predicted by the model, Portuguese firms are more
likely to enter in countries with higher D, even after controlling for trade barriers and des-
tination specific characteristics. The coefficient β2 is statistically significant at the 1% level,
and it implies that one standard deviation increase in the Diversification Index raises the
probability of exporting by 3%. Column 2 estimates a Probit model that confirms the
findings of Column 1. Moreover, since I cannot directly control for destination fixed ef-
fects, given the presence of ln(Dj), I follow Head and Mayer (2013) and Baker and Fortin
(2001) and use a more efficient two-step methodology, in which I first regress Pr
(
xsj > 0
)
on firm and destination fixed effects, and then regress the estimated destination fixed
effect on ln(Dj) and the other controls using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS).
Column 3 shows that the coefficient of ln(Dj) in the second stage is similar to that of
Column 1 but it has a much lower standard error.
I also investigate how the different components of the Diversification Index affect the
results. Column 4 shows that both the Sharpe Ratio, i.e. the mean/standard deviation
ratio, and the average covariance with all other markets significantly affect the firms’
exporting decision to a destination, suggesting that both are key drivers of the extensive
margin of trade.
57The gravity controls include the distance from Portugal, average ad-valorem tariff rate (from UNC-
TAD), dummies for common language, common legal origins, contiguity, common currency, WTO mem-
bership, regional trade agreement, and a dummy for European countries to control for the effect of the
European Union on trade flows.
Firm-level intensive margin. Proposition 2 states that, conditional on entering a market,
firms tend to sell more to countries with a high Diversification Index, conditional on trade
barriers and country characteristics. To test this prediction, I run the following “gravity”
regression:
ln
(
xsj
)
= β0 + δs + X
′
jβ1 + β2ln
(
Dj
)
+ ε js, (48)
where the controls are the same as for the extensive margin regressions. Column 1 in
Table 7 shows that results from the OLS regression, and confirms the prediction of the
model: conditional on entry, firms export more to countries with higher Diversification
Index, even after controlling for trade barriers and destination specific characteristics.
Column 2 performs, instead, a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation to con-
trol for heteroskedasticity as in Silva and Tenreyro (2006), while Column 3 performs a
two-stage Heckman estimation to control for selection of firms into exporting.58 Columns
4 performs the two-step methodology implemented also for the extensive margin. In all
specifications, results are similar to the baseline. Column 5 shows that both the destina-
tion’s Sharpe Ratio and the average covariance with all other markets significantly affect
the intensive margin of trade.
Country-sector intensive margin. As an external validation of the model’s predictions,
I also estimate the intensive margin regression using trade flows at the country level.
Specifically, I run the following gravity regression
ln
(
xij
)
= β0 + δi + X
′
ijβ1 + X
′
jβ2 + β3ln
(
Dj
)
+ εij. (49)
where xij are aggregate manufacturing trade flows from country i to j, with i 6= j, in 2005,
from UN Comtrade. δi is an exporter fixed effect, Xj is a set of destination-specific con-
trols, such as log of GDP, log of population, remoteness, trade openness, while Xij is a set
of bilateral gravity variables, including distance, log of bilateral tariffs, dummies for com-
mon language, common legal origins, contiguity, colonial links, common currency, WTO
membership.59 Column 1 in Table 8 estimates equation (49) with OLS, Column 2 with
PPML, Column 3 implements the two-steps methodology as in Head andMayer (2013).60
58As in Helpman et al. (2008b), I use the number of procedures to start a business, from Djankov et al.
(2002), as the variable that satisfies the exclusion restriction, i.e. it affects selection into foreign markets but
does not affect the second stage regression.
59For each pair of countries, I compute an average of the ad-valorem tariffs applied in 2005 within the
manufacturing sector. Data are from UNCTAD.
60FollowingHead andMayer (2013) and Baker and Fortin (2001), I additionally control for X¯j ≡ 1N ∑i Xij,
the average across exporters of each export-importer variable. Standard errors are clustered at the importer
level.
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All three columns display a positive and significant coefficient of ln
(
Dj
)
, suggesting that
the Diversification Index affects trade flows not only for Portuguese firms, but instead for
firms from all origins. The elasticity of trade flows with respect to Dj is around 0.15, while
the elasticity with respect to distance of -1, as typical found in the empirical literature (see
Head andMayer (2013)). Lastly, Column 4 shows that both the destination’s Sharpe Ratio
and the average covariance with all other markets significantly affect trade flows at the
country level.
One drawback of the previous regressions is that I cannot directly for destination fixed
effects, given the presence of ln
(
Dj
)
. This issue is however overcome when I exploit the
heterogeneity of the Diversification Index estimated at the sector-country level to imple-
ment the following gravity regression:
ln
(
xijk
)
= β0 + δi + δj + X
′
ijβ1 + β2ln
(
Djk
)
+ εijk, (50)
where i is the exporter, j is the importer, k is the manufacturing sector, and Xij is the same
set of variables as before. Column 5 in Table 8 shows that the coefficient on ln
(
Djk
)
is
similar to the baseline coefficient and is statistically significant at the 1% level, with an
elasticity of trade flows with respect to the Diversification Index of 0.11. Lastly, Column 6
documents that the Sharpe Ratio and the average covariance with other destinations also
significantly determine the intensity of trade flows across countries.
4.2 Untargeted moments
Having tested the predictions of the model with a reduced-form approach, I now use the
structure of the model more intensely, to test its ability to reproduce some salient features
of the data.
Entry of firms. As discussed in the theoretical section, Proposition 1 implies that the
firm’s entry decision in a market (that is, whether n > 0) does not depend on a market-
specific entry cutoff. Therefore, firms’ sorting into exporting is not strictly hierarchical, as
in traditional trade models with fixed costs, such as Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). In
these models, as well as in my model with no risk aversion, any firm selling to the k+ 1
most popular destination necessarily sells to the kmost popular destination as well, since
that has a lower entry cutoff.
Table 9 reports, for each of the top destinations from Portugal, the fraction of exporters
that are strictly sorted. Specifically, for each destination j, I consider all Portuguese ex-
porters selling there, and compute the fraction of firms selling to all destinations more
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popular than j. For instance, the table suggests that only 23% of Portuguese firms that in
2005 were exporting to US, the 7th most popular destination, were also exporting to all
the top 6 destinations. Across the top 7 destinations, the fraction of strictly sorted firms in
the data is 54%, it is 76% in mymodel with risk aversion, and it is by construction 100% in
a Melitz (2003) model.61 Therefore, my model is able to somewhat reproduce this feature
of the data, even without assuming that marketing costs are heterogeneous across firms,
as in Eaton et al. (2011).
Sales distribution. Propositions 1 and 2 suggest how firms, following their global
diversification strategy, may optimally reach only few consumers in a given market, and
thus export small amounts. I test this feature of the model by plotting, in Figure 7, the dis-
tribution of sales, across all destinations, of Portuguese small firms. The graph suggests
that the model with risk aversion is able to reproduce very well the left tail of the ob-
served distribution. In contrast, the model with γ = 0, which corresponds to a standard
fixed cost model such as Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008), cannot predict the existence of
small exporters, because of the presence of fixed costs of entry.62
5 Counterfactual Analysis
Armed with the calibrated model, I now conduct two counterfactual exercises to under-
stand better the economic mechanisms of the model and to quantify the impact of risk
diversification on welfare.
5.1 Welfare Gains from Trade
Following Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013), I focus on an important counterfactual
exercise: moving from autarky. Formally, starting from the calibrated trade equilibrium
in 2005, I assume that variable trade costs in the new equilibrium are such that τij = +∞
for all pair of countries i 6= j. All other structural parameters are the same as in the
initial equilibrium. Once I solve the equilibrium under autarky, I compute the welfare
gains associated with moving from autarky to the observed equilibrium. The presence
of a non-tradeable sector in the calibrated model implies that welfare is slightly different
61Evidence that exporters are not strictly sorted has been shown also by Eaton et al. (2011) and Armenter
and Koren (2015), among others.
62Arkolakis (2010) also shows that a model with convex marketing costs is able to replicate the observed
left tail of the sales distribution, while a fixed cost model cannot.
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from the baseline model:
Wi = ξ˜
(
wj
Pj
)ξ
L˜i +
Πi
Pi
− RPi (51)
where ξ˜ ≡ (ξ)ξ ((1− ξ))1−ξ . In addition, I compute the welfare gains in the limit case of
no risk aversion, γ = 0, which is isomorphic to the gains predicted by the large class of
models considered in ACR.63
Figure 8 shows that aggregate welfare gains are typically decreasing in the domes-
tic trade share, as in ACR, but they can deviate substantially from risk neutral models.
The overall numbers are small because the model includes a large non-tradeable sector,
while the trade shock is only in the manufacturing sector. Some countries, like Ireland,
Singapore and Germany, gain substantially more from trade than in ACR, while for other
countries, such as Canada and Czech Republic, the gains are very close to ACR. In relative
terms, welfare gains in my model are, for the median country, 16% higher than ACR.64
Therefore, the “pro-competitive” effect of risk diversification on welfare is quantitatively
relevant.
I now use the insights provided by the theory to investigate the determinants of the
welfare gains from trade. Using equation (51), I decompose thewelfare gains inmymodel
as
dlnWi =
ξ˜
(
wj/Pj
)ξ
L˜i
Wi
dln
((
wj/Pj
)ξ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
workers’ gains
+
Πi/Pi
Wi
dln (Πi/Pi)− R˜i
Wi
dlnR˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
entrepreneurs’ gains
. (52)
The first term reflects the gains that are accrued by workers, since their welfare is simply
given by the real wage. The second term in (52) represents the entrepreneurs’ welfare
gains, which in turn are the sum of the percentage change in real profits and in the ag-
gregate risk premium. Figure 9 plots the workers’ and the entrepreneurs’ gains against
the total welfare changes. While the change in the real wage is positive for all countries,
reflecting the effect of trade competition on prices, the change in the gains accrued by
firms is negative or close to zero for some markets.
To explain the heterogeneity in the entrepreneurs gains, it is useful to resort to the
63In the limit case of γ = 0, welfare gains can be computed simply as a function of the change in domestic
trade shares, the trade elasticity θ, and the share of consumption in manufacturing ξ. Since in autarky
domestic trade shares are by construction equal to 1, it suffices to know the domestic trade shares in the
initial calibrated equilibrium to compute the welfare gains under risk neutrality.
64Specifically, for each country I compute
lnWˆi−lnWˆi |γ=0
lnWˆi |γ=0
, and the median value is 16%.
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intuition provided by Proposition 4. In the symmetric countries case, the ability of firms
to exploit international trade to diversify risk depends crucially on the covariance of de-
mand with the foreign country. In particular, the firm-level Sharpe Ratio, i.e. the ratio
between expected and standard deviation of real profits, increases with free trade as long
as the firm is sufficiently productive, and the covariance of demand is sufficiently low
(and the competition effect is weak). In the general case with N asymmetric countries,
the presence of trade costs introduces an additional trade-off: while risk-minimizing en-
trepreneurs would like to export to countries with a lower covariance, they also want to
sell to countries with lower trade costs.
To capture this trade-off, I compute for each country the average covariance with the
other markets, weighted by the calibrated trade barriers in 2005.65 Figure 10 plots the av-
erage change in the Sharpe Ratio against the weighted average of the covariances. The re-
sults illustrate that countries, like for instance Ireland, Singapore and Germany, that have
cheaper access to destinations that are a good hedge against risk (i.e. destinations with
a lower covariance with domestic demand), are able to significantly improve their risk-
return profile upon a trade liberalization. On the other hand, for countries like Canada
and Czech Republic, the stronger competition coming from foreign firms lowers the av-
erage profits by more than the reduction in the volatility of profits coming from interna-
tional trade. In general, an improvement of the average risk-return profile is typically
reflected into higher entrepreneurs gains, as shown in the right graph of Figure 10.
5.1.1 Robustness
In this section I investigate the robustness of the counterfactual predictions of the model
along several dimensions. First, Panel A in Figure 11 plots the welfare gains from trade
computed using means and demand covariances estimated using the alternative method-
ologies described in Section 3.1.4. For all these alternative measures of risk, the resulting
welfare gains are very similar to the baseline.
Second, Panel B in Figure 11 plots the median welfare gains with different values of
the entrepreneurs’ risk aversion. Within a reasonable range for γ, gains from trade are
not substantially different from the baseline, but they are a hump-shaped function of γ.
Intuitively, going from an economy with risk neutrality to one with risk aversion implies
that firms use more intensively international trade to diversify their demand risk. This
leads to more trade competition among firms and lower prices. However, as the risk
aversion becomes too high, entrepreneurs optimally choose to be less exposed to foreign
65In particular, I compute ¯Covj = ∑s
τjs
∑k τjk
Cov(αj, αs), where τjs are the trade costs calibrated in 2005.
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risk, which leads to lower competitive pressure, and smaller welfare gains.66
Lastly, I repeat the counterfactual exercise using, instead of the constant risk aversion
utility of the baseline, a CRRA utility function, which features a decreasing absolute risk
aversion (see Appendix 8.1.15). I set the risk aversion parameter to 1, as estimated in
Allen and Atkin (2016). Panel C in Figure 11 documents that welfare gains with CRRA
are highly correlated with, but on average higher than, the ones predicted by the baseline
model.
5.2 China Shock
The second counterfactual exercise I consider is an exogenous increase in productivity.
Starting from the calibrated economy in 2005, I simulate an increase in the productivity
of China by 30%, which is the observed increase in Chinese TFP from 2005 to 2015.67 In
the model, this corresponds to a 30% decrease in trade costs from China to all countries
(including the domestic market).
As shown in Figure 12, the China shock generates in all countries an increase in the
real wage, due to cheaper goods, that is partially offset by a reduction in entrepreneurs
gains, with a net effect for the median country of only 0.2%.68 For instance, countries
such as Israel and Australia experience an increase in workers welfare due to cheaper
consumption goods from China, but at the same time they have welfare losses for en-
trepreneurs because of reduced profits.69 In addition, the productivity boom of Chinese
firms decreases the export activity of the firms from other countries, which have a harder
time to diversify domestic risk with international trade. Therefore, the China shock has
a negative effect not only on average profits, but also on their volatility, as reflected in
lower average Sharpe Ratios, as shown in Figure 13.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I characterize the link between demand risk, firms’ exporting decisions,
66Note that in the limit case of an infinite risk aversion, firms optimally decide to not produce at all.
67I use the TFP estimates from PennWorld Tables 9.1 (see Feenstra et al. (2015)). Ideally, I could calibrate
the economy before the China’s accession to WTO, and then simulate the observed increase in productivity
and the decrease in trade costs. However, in such case I would only be using 5 years to estimate the
moments of the demand shocks (since the dataset only starts in 1995), implying less precise estimates.
68Note that, while quite small, this number is remarkably consistent with the counterfactual result found
for US, in a very different framework, by Caliendo et al. (2015).
69Interestingly, countries geographically closer to China, like South Korea and Japan, are able to reap
higher real profits after the China shock, due to increased exports toward the richer Chinese consumers.
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and welfare gains from trade. The proposed framework is sufficiently tractable to deliver
testable implications and to be calibrated using firm-level data. Theoretically, I stress the
importance of the cross-country multilateral covariance of demand in amplifying the im-
pact of a change in trade costs through a novel “pro-competitive” effect. Empirically, I
show that the Diversification Index, the country-level measure of demand risk, signifi-
cantly affects trade patterns in a gravity framework. Quantitatively, an important mes-
sage emerges from the analysis: a trade liberalization affects the risk-return trade-off that
firms face on global markets, implying general equilibrium effects that may increase wel-
fare gains from trade relative to standard trade models with risk neutrality.
Several avenues for future researchmay emerge frommy study. For example, it would
be interesting to introduce the possibility of product diversification as a tool to reduce
profits volatility, as opposed to, or together with, geographical diversification, which has
been the focus of this paper. In addition, one could enrich the model with dynamic learn-
ing, for example allowing firms to invest to reduce the degree of uncertainty over time.
Different measures of aggregate uncertainty have been used by the macro and trade
literature. These include, among others: stockmarket volatility (Bloom (2009)), newspaper-
basedmeasures (Baker et al. (2016)), policy uncertaintymeasures (Pierce and Schott (2016)),
GDP volatility (Koren and Tenreyro (2007)). The Diversification Index proposed in this
paper differs from the existing measures, as it takes into account for the entire pattern of
spatial correlation of demand across countries. Therefore, one application could be to use
it to control for demand risk in cross-country regressions.
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7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Moments: summary statistics
Statistic Covariance Variance Mean SE
Min -1.73 1.01 1.27 0.007
Median -0.04 3.35 1.55 0.0161
Max 2.49 24.85 2.35 1.643
Standard dev. 0.30 4.48 0.22 0.072
Notes: The first column reports some summary statistics for the estimated covariances, the second column for the variances, the third
column for the means α¯i , the fourth column for the bootstrapped standard errors associated with the covariance matrix Σ.
Table 2: Demand covariances and geography
Dep. var.: demand covariance (1) (2) (3)
Bilateral log distance -0.024*** -0.069*** -0.063***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 1,190 1,190 1,190
R-squared 0.006 0.038 0.041
Country FE N Y Y
Gravity variables N N Y
Notes: Column 1 reports the estimate of a regression of the bilateral demand covariances on the bilateral log distance between the
countries, Column 2 adds country fixed effects, Column 3 adds dummies for contiguity, common language, common legal origins,
colonial relationship.
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Table 3: Diversification Index
Country Number of firms Diversification
selling in 2005 Index
Australia 266 0.99 (0.046)
Austria 367 0.68 (0.041)
Belgium-Lux. 949 0.87 (0.046)
Brazil 302 0.46 (0.033)
Canada 533 0.64 (0.045)
Chile 74 1.13 (0.045)
China 184 0.19 (0.016)
Czech Republic 211 0.57 (0.029)
Denmark 572 0.55 (0.036)
Finland 366 0.93 (0.055)
France 1,971 1.04 (0.056)
Germany 1,283 0.84 (0.049)
Greece 386 0.94 (0.049)
Hungary 189 0.82 (0.030)
Ireland 436 0.83 (0.052)
Israel 213 0.70 (0.039)
Italy 897 0.53 (0.036)
Japan 300 0.60 (0.034)
Rep. of Korea 112 0.47 (0.027)
Malaysia 55 0.21 (0.013)
Mexico 187 0.52 (0.031)
Morocco 286 1.12 (0.053)
Netherlands 954 0.77 (0.045)
Norway 370 0.83 (0.053)
Poland 241 0.55 (0.030)
Portugal 4,821 0.76 (0.054)
Romania 167 0.46 (0.033)
Russia 164 0.49 (0.037)
Singapore 100 0.52 (0.029)
South Africa 195 0.68 (0.045)
Spain 2,420 0.84 (0.049)
Sweden 597 0.76 (0.045)
Turkey 221 0.38 (0.022)
United Kingdom 1,294 0.91 (0.053)
United States 931 1.06 (0.061)
Total 4,821
Notes: The second column reports, for each country, the number of Portuguese firms that were exporting there in 2005. The third
column reports the estimated Diversification Indices, with bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Diversification Index by Sector
Statistic Baseline Food/Tobacco Textile Wood Minerals Metals Machinery Others
Min 0.19 -0.54 0.00 -1.63 -0.88 -3.64 -0.56 -0.28
Median 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.76 0.40 0.57 0.64 0.68
Max 1.13 16.28 3.16 7.53 3.00 17.50 11.77 11.60
Average SE 0.04 0.48 0.04 0.41 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.07
Notes: The first row reports the minimum of the Diversification Indices for the baseline and for each sector, the second row reports the
median, the third row reports the maximum, the fourth row reports the average bootstrapped standard error.
Table 5: Risk aversion
Dep. Var.: Average Marginal Profits (1) (2) (3)
Variance of Marginal Profits 0.415*** 0.282*** 0.413***
(0.106) (0.052) (0.065)
Destination Fixed Effect Y Y Y
Observations 16,017 12,546 11,570
R2 0.413 0.467 0.489
Notes: The table regresses the average marginal profits of Portuguese firms on the variance of marginal profits. Both statistics are
computed using yearly data from 1995 to 2004. Column 1 uses the baseline sample, Column 2 excludes Portugal, Column 3 includes
only established exporters. All regressions are weighted by firms’ total sales in 2005, standard errors are clustered at the destination
level to adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation across firms. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis (***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 6: Extensive margin and risk
Dep. var.: Pr
(
xsj > 0
)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Dj) 0.119*** 0.350** 0.119***
(0.044) (0.136) (0.001)
Sharpe Ratio 0.477***
(0.002)
Average covariance -0.484***
(0.009)
Log of GDP 0.100*** 0.388*** 0.100*** 0.104***
(0.019) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Distance -0.317*** -0.335*** -0.317*** -0.318***
(0.111) (0.120) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm F.E. YES NO YES YES
Obs. 86,823 86,823 86,823 86,823
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if Portuguese firm s enters market j in 2005, and equal 0 otherwise. Column 1
uses OLS, column 2 uses a Probit model, columns 3-5 report the results from the second stage of the two-step methodology proposed
by Head andMayer (2013) and Baker and Fortin (2001), using FGLS. Additional not reported controls are: remoteness, trade openness,
log of population, average tariff rate, dummies for common language, common legal origins, contiguity, common currency, WTO
membership, regional trade agreement, and a dummy for European countries. Regressions are weighted by firm’s total sales. All data
are for 2005. Clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
53
Table 7: Intensive margin and risk, firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Dj) 0.994*** 0.869*** 0.862*** 1.031***
(0.264) (0.194) (0.103) (0.013)
Sharpe Ratio 2.99***
(0.038)
Average covariance -5.711***
(0.196)
Log of GDP 0.674*** 0.492*** 0.394*** 0.678*** 0.745***
(0.149) (0.131) (0.089) (0.009) (0.008)
Log of Distance -1.151 -1.328* 0.017 -0.785*** -0.995***
(0.936) (0.685) (0.328) (0.049) (0.048)
Firm F.E. YES NO NO YES YES
Obs. 13,236 13,236 86,823 12,486 12,486
Notes: In Columns 1,3,4,5,6 the dependent variable is the log of exports of a Portuguese firm to country j in 2005, while Column 2 uses
the level of exports. Column 1 uses OLS, column 2 uses PPML, column 3 reports the results from the second stage of a Heckman two-
steps methodology, columns 4-6 report the results from the second stage of the two-step methodology proposed by Head and Mayer
(2013) and Baker and Fortin (2001), using FGLS. Additional not reported controls are: remoteness, trade openness, log of population,
average tariff rate, dummies for common language, common legal origins, contiguity, common currency, WTO membership, regional
trade agreement, and a dummy for European countries. Regressions are weighted by firm’s total sales. All data are for 2005. Clustered
standard errors are shown in parenthesis ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
54
Table 8: Intensive margin and risk, country level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Dj) 0.162** 0.283*** 0.143***
(0.072) (0.084) (0.024)
ln(Djk) 0.109***
(0.022)
Sharpe Ratio 0.409*** 0.404***
(0.065) (0.060)
Average covariance -3.314*** -0.828***
(0.264) (0.195)
Log of GDP 1.069*** 1.014*** 1.052*** 1.103***
(0.032) (0.046) (0.011) (0.012)
Log of Bilateral Distance -0.993*** -0.663*** -1.240*** -1.231***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.056) (0.054)
Origin F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination F.E. NO NO NO NO YES YES
Obs. 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 7,060 7,060
Notes: In Columns 1,3,4,5,6 the dependent variable is the log of bilateral exports between all pairs of countries i 6= j in the sample, while
Column 2 uses the level of exports. Columns 1,5,6 use OLS, column 2 uses PPML, columns 3,4 report the results from the second stage
of the two-step methodology proposed by Head and Mayer (2013) and Baker and Fortin (2001), using FGLS. Additional not reported
controls are: remoteness, trade openness, log of population, log of bilateral tariffs, dummies for common language, common legal
origins, contiguity, common currency, WTO membership, regional trade agreement, and a dummy for European countries. Columns
3,4 additionally control for X¯j ≡ 1N ∑i Xij, the average across exporters of each bilateral variable (that is why the bilateral distance
does not appear). All data are for 2005. Clustered standard errors are shown in parenthesis ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Table 9: Sorting of exporters
Destination Rank Fraction sorted, data Fraction sorted, model
France 2 77% 94%
UK 3 66% 77%
Germany 4 50% 95%
Netherland 5 46% 61%
Belgium 6 35% 60%
USA 7 23% 76%
Total 54% 76%
Notes: For each destination ranked k-th in terms of popularity, I consider all Portuguese firms exporting to that destination, and
compute the fraction of exporters that sells to all markets with rank lower than k.
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Figure 1: Main business challenges
Notes: The figure shows the results from a survey conducted in 2011 and 2012 by the consulting firm Capgemini among 350 leading
companies around the world. The question asked to the firms was: “What is the most important challenge for your firm?”. The graph
shows that 52% of the respondents thought demand volatility was the main challenge (or business driver) in 2012, up from 40% in
2011. Source: https://www.capgemini.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The_2012_Global_Supply_Chain_Agenda.pdf
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Figure 2: Distribution of Covariances
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of the estimated bilateral covariances of demand.
Figure 3: Diversification Index and income per capita
Notes: The figure plots the log of GDP per capita in 2005 against the estimated Diversification Index of the countries in the sample.
The displayed relationship is 5% significant.
57
Figure 4: Diversification Index: robustness
Notes: The figures plot the baseline Diversification Index against, respectively: i) the Diversification Index computed without control-
ling for firm-destination supply shocks; ii) the Diversification Index computed taking an average across each firm’s covariances; iii) the
Diversification Index computed taking into account for macro shocks; iv) the Diversification Index computed with only established
firm-destination pairs. The displayed relationships are all 1% significant.
Figure 5: Calibration of trade shares
Notes: The figure plots the simulated and the actual values of bilateral trade shares in 2005. The correlation is 0.98.
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Figure 6: Fraction of trade explained by risk
Notes: The figure plots the trade shares of the calibrated model vs the corresponding shares of the calibrated model with the risk
aversion parameter set to 0. The figure also displays the best fit line, which has an intercept of 0.0048, a slope of 0.8310, and an R2 of
85%. The remaining variation, 15%, is the fraction of trade shares that is not explained by the risk neutral model.
Figure 7: Sales distribution
Notes: The figure plots the left tail of the distribution of log sales in the calibrated model and in the data. I first compute the percentiles
for each destination and then I take an average across destinations for each percentile.
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Figure 8: Welfare gains from trade
Notes: The figure plots the percentage change in welfare after moving from autarky to the calibrated equilibrium. The red crosses are
the gains predicted by a model with risk neutrality, while the dots with country names are the gains predicted by the model with risk
aversion.
Figure 9: Decomposition of Welfare Gains from Trade
Notes: The figure on the left plots the percentage change in workers’ welfare after moving from autarky to the calibrated equilibrium,
against the total welfare gains. The figure on the right plots instead the percentage change in entrepreneurs’ welfare against the total
welfare gains.
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Figure 10: Risk Diversification and Entrepreneurs gains
Notes: The figure on the left plots the average change in SR(z) across firms after a trade liberalization against the average covariance
with other countries, weighted by the bilateral trade costs. The OLS coefficient is -.712 and the p-value is 0.01.The figure on the right
plots the entrepreneurs gains against the average change in SR(z). The OLS coefficient is 1.06 and the p-value is 0.01.
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Figure 11: Welfare Gains from Trade - Robustness
Notes: The figure on the top left plots the baseline welfare gains from trade against the gains computed using means and demand
covariances estimated with the alternative methodologies described in section 3.1.4. These are the moments computed: i) using only
established firm-destination pairs; ii) taking into account for macro shocks; iii) without controlling for firm-destination supply shocks;
iv) taking an average across each firm’s covariances. The figure on the top right reports the welfare gains from trade for different
values for the risk aversion, relative to the baseline welfare gains (which assumes a risk aversion of 0.41). The figure at the bottom
plots the baseline welfare changes against the corresponding changes computed with a CRRA utility function with risk aversion
parameter ρ = 1, as in Allen and Atkin (2016).
62
Figure 12: Welfare gains after China Shock
Notes: The figure on the left plots the counterfactual percentage change in total welfare against the workers’ welfare gains after the
China shock. The figure on the right plots instead total welfare gains against entrepreneurs gains. See equation (52).
Figure 13: China Shock and Risk Diversification
Notes: The figure plots the entrepreneurs gains after the counterfactual increase in Chinese productivity against the average, across
firms, change in the Sharpe Ratio of real profits.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Analytical appendix
8.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since the firm sets the optimal price after the realization of the shock, in the first stage
it chooses the optimal fraction of consumers to reach in each market based on the expec-
tation of what the price will be in the second stage. I solve the optimal problem of the
firm by backward induction, starting from the second stage. At this stage, there is no
uncertainty and thus the firm chooses the optimal pricing policy that maximizes profits,
given the optimal nij(z, E[pij(z)]) chosen in the first stage:
max{pij} ∑
j
αj(z)
pij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
nij(z, E[pij(z)])Yj
(
pij(z)−
τijwi
z
)
.
noting that the firm has already paid the marketing costs in the first stage. It is easy to see
that this leads to the standard constant markup over marginal cost:
pij(z) =
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
. (53)
Notice that, given the linearity of profits in nij(z, E[pij(z)]) and αj(z), due to the assump-
tions of CES demand and constant returns to scale in labor, the optimal price does not
depend on neither nij(z, E[pij(z)]) nor αj. The optimal quantity produced is:
qij(z) = αj(z)
(
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
)−σ nij(z, E[pij(z)])Yj
P1−σj
. (54)
I now solve the firm problem in the first stage, when there is uncertainty on the realization
of the shocks. By backward induction, in the first stage the firm takes as given the pricing
rule in (53) and the quantity produced in (54). The maximization problem of firm z is:
max{nij} ∑
j
α¯jnij(z)rij(z)− γ
2 ∑
j
∑
s
nij(z)rij(z)nis(z)ris(z)Cov(αj, αs)−∑
j
wjnij(z) f jLj
s. to 1 ≥ nij(z) ≥ 0
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where rij(z) ≡ 1Pi
pij(z)
−σYj
P1−σj
(
pij(z)− τijwiz
)
. Given the optimal price in (53), this simplifies
to:
rij(z) =
1
Pi
(
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
)1−σ Yj
P1−σj σ
The Lagrangian is, omitting the z for simplicity:
L = ∑
j
α¯jnijrij − γ2 ∑
j
∑
s
nijrijnisrisCov(αj, αs)−∑
j
wjnij(z) f jLj/Pi −∑
j
µijg(nij)
where g(nij) = nij − 1. The necessary Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂nij
=
∂U
∂nij
− µij
∂g(nij)
∂nij
≤ 0 ∂L
∂nij
nij = 0
∂L
∂µij
≥ 0 ∂L
∂µj
µij = 0
Amore compact way of writing the above conditions is to introduce the auxiliary variable
λij, which is such that
∂U
∂nij
− µij
∂g(nij)
∂nij
+ λij = 0
and thus λij = 0 if nij > 0, while λij > 0 if nij = 0. Then the first order condition for nij
becomes:
α¯jrij − γ ∑
s
rijnisrisCov(αj, αs)− wj f jLj/Pi − µij + λij = 0
I can write the solution for nij(z) in matrix form as:
ni =
1
γ
(
Σ˜i
)−1
ri, (55)
where each element of the N−dimensional vector ri equals:
r
j
i ≡ rijα¯j − wj f jLj/Pi − µij + λij, (56)
and Σ˜i is a NxN covariance matrix, whose k, j element is, from equation (13):
Σ˜i,kj = rijrik(z)Cov(αj, αk).
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The inverse of Σ˜i is, by the Cramer’s rule:
(
Σ˜i
)−1
= ri
1
det(Σ)
Ciri, (57)
where ri is the inverse of a diagonal matrix whose j − th element is rij, and Ci is the
(symmetric) matrix of cofactors of Σ.70 Since rij > 0 for all i and j, then
det(Σ) 6= 0
is a sufficient condition to have invertibility of ∑˜i. This is Assumption 2 in the main text.
Replacing equations (57) and (56) into (55), the optimal nij is:
nij =
∑k
Cjk
rik
(
rikα¯k − wβi w
1−β
k fkLk/Pi − µik + λik
)
γrij
,
where Cjk is the j, k cofactor of Σ, rescaled by det(Σ). Finally, the solution above is a global
maximum if i) the constraints are quasi convex and ii) the objective function is concave.
The constraints are obviously quasi convex since their are linear. The Hessian matrix of
the objective function is:
H(z) =


∂2U
∂2nij
∂2U
∂nij∂niN
. .
. .
∂2U
∂niN∂nij
∂2U
∂2niN

 ,
where, for all pairs j, k:
∂2U
∂nij∂nik
=
∂2U
∂nik∂nij
= −γδijδikCov(αj, αk) < 0
Given that ∂
2U
∂2nij
< 0, the Hessian is negative semi-definite if and only if its determinant is
positive. It is easy to see that the determinant of the Hessian can be written as:
det(H) =
N
∏
j=1
γδij(z)
2det(Σ),
70The cofactor is defined as Ckj ≡ (−1)k+jMkj, where Mkj is the (k, j) minor of Σ. The minor of a matrix
is the determinant of the sub-matrix formed by deleting the k-th row and j-th column.
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which is always positive if
det(Σ) > 0,
which always holds by Assumption 2 and since Σ is a covariance matrix. Therefore the
function is concave and the solution is a global maximum, given the price index P, income
Y and wage w.
8.1.2 Alternative production structure
In this section I solve the problem of the firm under the assumption that the firm makes
also the production decision under uncertainty, i.e. it pre-commits to production in the
first stage. In such case, in the first stage the firm not only pays the marketing costs,
but also pays workers to produce. After the demand shocks are realized, then the firm
adjusts the price in each location such that the amount of goods already produced for
each location exactly equal the realized demand. Specifically, there are three stages:
i. The firmmaximizes the expected utility by choosing nij(E[pij(z)], z), where E[pij(z)]
is the expectation of the price it will charge after the shock is realized. This stage is
solved exactly in the same way as in Proposition 1.
ii. Given the set of destinations and the number of consumers chosen in the first stage,
nij(E[pij(z)], z), the firm hires workers to produce the corresponding quantity, still
under uncertainty. However, since the firm has already decided the locations in
which to sell to, the firm simply has to maximize expected gross profits in each
destination separately:
max{pij} ∑
j
E[αj]
pij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
nij(E[pij(z)], z)Yj
(
pij(z)−
τijwi
z
)
which leads to
p˜ij(z) =
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
(58)
Thus the quantity produced at this stage is:
q
produced
ij = E[αj]
p˜ij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
nij(E[pij(z)], z)Yj (59)
iii. The firm learns the demand shocks αj in the countries it entered, and adjusts the
price so that
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q
produced
ij = q
realized
ij (60)
in each destination j. Thus, the firm cannot reallocate resources across locations after the
shocks, because it has already produced and paid workers, but it will only change the
price.
Given equation (59), the above becomes
E[αj]
p˜ij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
nij(E[pij(z)], z)Yj = αj(z)
pij(z)
−σ
P1−σj
nij(E[pij(z)], z)Yj
where nij(E[pij(z)], z) is chosen in the first stage and cannot be changed. Then we have:
α¯j p˜ij(z)
−σ = αj(z)pij(z)−σ
where α¯j ≡ E[αj]. This implies the following final price
pij(z) =
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
(
αj(z)
α¯j
) 1
σ
(61)
Intuitively, the higher the realized demand shock relative to the expected shock, the
higher is the effective price charged, in order to extract more revenues from the higher
demand.
By backward induction, in the first stage the firm takes the expectation over the price
it will charge in the third stage, which is:
E[pij(z)] =
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
α˜j
where α˜j ≡ E
[(
αj(z)
) 1
σ
] (
α¯j
)− 1σ . I assume that E [(αj(z)) 1σ ] is a finite moment. Therefore
we have that:
rij(z) =
1
Pi
(
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
)1−σ
α˜j
Yj
P1−σj σ
and nij(z) is still given by:
nij =
∑k
Cjk
rik
(
rikα¯k − wβi w
1−β
k fkLk/Pi − µik + λik
)
γrij
.
68
Under this alternative formulation, the price index is
P1−σi = ∑
j
Mj
∫ ∞
z
∫ ∞
0
αi(z)nji(z)pji(z)
1−σg(z)h(α)dαdz =
= α˜iα¯i ∑
j
Mj
∫ ∞
z
nji(z)
(
σ
σ − 1
τjiwj
z
)1−σ
g(z)dz
which differs from the baseline price index only by the presence of α˜i. The profits are
Πi = Mi ∑
j
(
1
σ
α˜jα¯j
∫ ∞
z
nij(z)Yj
P1−σj
(
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
)1−σ
g(z)dz−
∫ ∞
z
fij(z)g(z)dz
)
which also differ only by the presence of α˜i. Finally, the labor clearing condition becomes:
Mi ∑
j
α¯j
∫ ∞
z
τij
z
1
P1−σj
(
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
)−σ
nij(z)Yjg(z)dz+ Mi ∑
j
∫ ∞
z
f jnij(z)Ljg(z)dz = L˜i
as in the baseline model.
8.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1, the optimal solution can be written as (omitting the z to simplify
notation):
nij =
∑k
Cjk
rik
(
rikα¯k − wβi w
1−β
k fkLk/Pi − µik + λik
)
γrij
=
=
Dj
γrij
−
∑k
Cjk
rik
(
w
β
i w
1−β
k fkLk/Pi
)
γrij
+
∑k
Cjk
rik
(λik − µik)
γrij
(62)
where Dj = ∑k Cjkα¯k is the Diversification Index of destination j. In the case of an interior
solution, we have that:
nij(z) =
Dj
γrij
−
∑k
Cjk
rik
(
w
β
i w
1−β
k fkLk/Pi
)
γrij
(63)
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and therefore both the probability of entering j (i.e. the probability that nij(z) > 0) and
the level of exports to j,
xij(z) = αj(z)
(
σ
σ − 1
τijwi
z
)1−σ Yj
P1−σj
nij(z) (64)
are increasing in Dj. When instead there is at least one binding constraint (either the
firm sets nik(z) = 0 or nik(z) = 1 for at least one k), then the corresponding Lagrange
multiplier will be positive. Therefore:
∂nij(z)
∂Dj
=
1
γrij︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+
1
γrij
[
∑
k 6=j
Cjk
rik
∂λik
∂Dj
− ∑
k 6=j
Cjk
rik
∂µik
∂Dj
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
(65)
Note that λik is zero if nik(z) > 0, otherwise it equals:
λik = −α¯krik + γrik ∑
s 6=j
nisrisCov(αk, αs) + w
β
i w
1−β
k fkLk/Pi
and therefore
∂λik
∂Dj
= γrik ∑
s 6=j
∂nis(z)
∂Dj
risCov(αk, αs) (66)
Similarly for the other Lagrange multiplier:
µik = α¯krik − γrik ∑
s 6=j
nisrisCov(αk, αs)− γr2ikVar(αk)− wβi w
1−β
k fkLk/Pi
and thus:
∂µik
∂Dj
= −γrik ∑
s 6=j
∂nis(z)
∂Dj
risCov(αk, αs) = −∂λik∂Dj (67)
Now notice that either µik > 0 and λik = 0, or λik > 0 and µik = 0. Combining this fact
with equations 66 and 67, equation 65 becomes:
∂nij(z)
∂Dj
=
1
γrij
[
1+ γ ∑
k 6=j
Cjk ∑
s 6=j
∂nis(z)
∂Dj
risCov(αk, αs)
]
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Define xj ≡ ∂nij(z)∂Dj γrij. Since γrij > 0, the sign of xj equals the sign of the derivative of
interest,
∂nij(z)
∂Dj
. Then the above can be written as:
xj = 1+ ∑
k 6=j
Cjk ∑
s 6=j
xsCov(αk, αs)
This is a linear system of N equations in N unknowns, xj. We can rewrite it as AX = B,
where A is a NxN matrix:
A =


1 −∑k 6=1 C1kCov(αk, α2) ... −∑k 6=1 C1kCov(αk, αN)
−∑k 6=2 C2kCov(αk, α1) 1 ... −∑k 6=2 C2kCov(αk, αN)
... ... ... ...
−∑k 6=N CNkCov(αk, α1) −∑k 6=N C2kCov(αk, α2) ... 1

 ,
that is
Aij =

−∑k 6=i CikCov(αk, αj) , i 6= j1 , i = j .
and B is a Nx1 vector of ones. It follows that
X = A−1B.
Since B is a positive vector, in order to have X positive, it is sufficient that A−1 is a
non-negative matrix. By Theorem 2.3. in chapter 6 of Berman and Plemmons (1994) (see
also Pena (1995)), a necessary and sufficient condition for A−1 to be non-negative is A
being a M-matrix, i.e. all off-diagonal elements are negative. Finally, it is easy to verify
that A is a M-matrix whenever some, but not all, demand correlations are negative.71 
8.1.4 Model with risk neutrality
With risk neutrality, the objective function is:
71For example, this can be seen for the case N = 4, where a typical element of the matrix A looks like:
A21 = ρ12σ
3
1σ2σ
2
3σ
2
4 (1− ρ213 − ρ214 − ρ234 + 2ρ13ρ14ρ34).
71
max{nij} ∑
j
α¯jnij(z)rij(z)−∑
j
wjnij(z) f jLj/Pi
Notice that the above is simply linear in nij(z), and therefore it is always optimal,
upon entry, to set nij(z) = 1. Therefore the firm’s problem boils down to a standard entry
decision, as in Melitz (2003), which implies that the firm enters a market j only if expected
profits are positive. This in turn implies the existence of an entry cutoff, given by:
(
z¯ij
)σ−1
=
wj f jLjP
1−σ
j σ
α¯j
(
σ
σ−1τijwi
)1−σ
Yj
(68)
To find the welfare gains from trade in the case of γ = 0, I first write the equation for
trade shares
λij =
Mi
∫ ∞
z¯ij
α¯jpij(z)qij(z)gi(z)dz
wjLj
=
Mi
∫ ∞
z¯ij
α¯jpij (z)
1−σ gi(z)dz
P1−σj
(69)
Inverting the above:
Miφ(τijwi)
1−σ (z¯ij)σ−θ−1
λij
= P1−σj . (70)
where φ is a constant. Substituting for the cutoff, and using the fact that when γ = 0
profits are a constant share of total income (see ACR), I can write the real wage as a
function of trade shares:
(
wj
Pj
)
= ϑλ
− 1θ
jj , (71)
where ϑ is a constant. Since the risk aversion is zero, and profits are a constant share of
total income, the percentage change in welfare is simply:
dlnWj = −dlnPj (72)
where I have also set the wage as the numeraire. Substituting 71 into 72, we get:
dlnWj = −1θ dlnλjj
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Lastly, from the equation for trade shares and using the assumption of Pareto distributed
productivities, it is easy to verify that −θ equals the trade elasticity.
8.1.5 Model with autarky
Lemma 1. Assume that γ >
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)θ
(
α¯MDAσ
((
σ
σ−1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯
) θ
1−σ ( σ−1
θ+σ−1
))− 1θ (
DAα¯
4 f
) 1+θ
θ
.
Then the optimal solution is:
- n(z) = 0 if z ≤ z∗
- 0 < n(z) < 1 if z > z∗, where:
n(z) =
DA
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
where
z∗ =
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 f P1−σσ
α¯Y
) 1
σ−1
and
r(z) =
1
P
(
σ
σ − 1
1
z
)1−σ Y
P1−σσ
.
Proof. As in Proposition 1, the optimal price is a constant markup over marginal cost:
p =
σ
σ − 1
1
z
and thus real gross profits are:
r(z) =
1
P
(
σ
σ − 1
1
z
)1−σ Y
P1−σσ
The Lagrangian is:
Li(z) = α¯n(z)r(z)− γ2Var(α)n
2(z)r2(z)− n(z) f + λn(z) + µ(1− n(z))
and the FOCs are:
α¯r(z)− f/P− γn(z)r2(z)Var(α) + λ− µ = 0
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Thus n(z) becomes:
n(z) =
α¯r(z)− f/P+ λ− µ
r2(z)Var(α)γ
To get rid of the upper bound multiplier µ, I now find a restriction on parameters such
that it is always optimal to choose n(z) < 1. When the optimal solution is n = 0, then this
holds trivially. If instead n > 0, and thus λ = 0, then it must hold that:
n(z) =
α¯r(z)− f/P
r2(z)Var(α)γ
< 1
Rearranging:
γ >
α¯r(z)− f/P
r2(z)Var(α)
(73)
The RHS of the above inequality is a function of the productivity z. For the inequality to
hold for any z, it suffices to hold for the productivity z that maximizes the RHS. It is easy
to verify that such z is:
zmax =
(
2 f
α¯u˜
) 1
σ−1
(74)
where u˜ =
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ Y
P1−σσ . Therefore a sufficient condition to have 73 is:
γ >
α¯ u˜P
2 f
α¯u˜ − f/P(
u˜
P
2 f
α¯u˜
)2
Var(α)
= P
α¯2
f4Var(α)
(75)
In what follows (see equation (81)), I show that if the above inequality holds, the optimal
price index is given by:
P =
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)(1+θ) (κ2)
− 1θ+1 (76)
where χ depends only on σ and θ, and where κ2 ≡ α¯MDAσγ (x)
θ
1−σ
(
σ−1
θ+σ−1
)
and x ≡(
σ
σ−1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯ . Plugging equation (81) into the above inequality implies that:
γ >
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)(1+θ)
(
α¯MDAσ
1
γ
(x)
θ
1−σ
(
σ − 1
θ + σ − 1
))− 1θ+1 DAα¯
f4
Rearranging:
γ >
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)θ
(
α¯MDAσ (x)
θ
1−σ
(
σ − 1
θ + σ − 1
))− 1θ (DAα¯
f4
) 1+θ
θ
(77)
If (77) holds, then any firm will always choose to set nij(z) < 1. Then, the FOC becomes:
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α¯r(z)− f/P− γn(z)r2(z)Var(α) + λ = 0
I now guess and verify that the optimal n(z) is such that: if z > z∗ then n(z) > 0, other-
wise n(z) = 0. First I find such cutoff by solving n(z∗) = 0:
z∗ =
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 f P1−σσ
α¯Y
) 1
σ−1
and the corresponding optimal n(z) is:
n(z) =
1
γ
α¯
Var(α)
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
If the guess is correct, then it must be that, when z < z∗, the FOC is satisfied with a
positive λ and thus n(z) = 0. Indeed, notice that setting n(z) = 0 gives:
α¯r(z)− f + λ = 0
and so the multiplier is:
λ = f − α¯r(z)
which is positive only if f > α¯r(z), that is, when z < z∗. Therefore the guess is verified.
Lastly, the optimal solution can be written more compactly as:
n(z) =
DA
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
where DA ≡ α¯Var(α) is the Diversification Index.
Equilibrium. Assuming that θ > σ − 1 > 0, and normalizing the wage to 1, current
account balance implies that total income is:
YA = wi L˜i + Πi = L˜+ κ1P
1+θY
θ
σ−1
A (78)
where κ1 ≡ MDAγ (x)
θ
1−σ α¯
[
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
]
and where x ≡ ( σσ−1)σ−1 σ fα¯ .
The price index equation is:
P1−σi = α¯M
∫ ∞
z∗
nji(z)pji(z)
1−σθz−θ−1dz =
= Y
−θ−1+σ
1−σ
A P
2−σ+θκ2
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where κ2 ≡ α¯MDAσγ (x)
θ
1−σ
(
σ−1
θ+σ−1
)
. Rearranging:
Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
A /κ2 = P
1+θ (79)
Plug equation 79 into equation 78:
YA = L˜+ κ1P
1+θY
θ
σ−1
A =
= L˜+
κ1
κ2
Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
A Y
θ
σ−1
A = L˜+
κ1
κ2
YA
and therefore total income is:
YA = χL˜ (80)
where χ ≡ σ(
σ−1
θ+σ−1)
σ( σ−1θ+σ−1)−[ σ−1−θθ+σ−1+ θθ+2σ−2 ]
, and the price index is:
PA =
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)(1+θ) (κ2)
− 1θ+1 (81)
8.1.6 Model with two symmetric countries and free trade
Lemma 2. Assume countries are perfectly symmetric and there is free trade. Assume that γ >(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)θ
(
α¯2MDFTσ
((
σ
σ−1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯
) θ
1−σ ( σ−1
θ+σ−1
))− 1θ (
Dα¯
4 f
) θ+1
θ
. Then the optimal solution
is:
- nij = 0 if z ≤ z∗
- 0 < n(z) < 1 if z > z∗, where:
n(z) =
DFT
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
where
z∗ =
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 f P1−σσ
α¯Y
) 1
σ−1
and
r(z) =
1
P
(
σ
σ − 1
1
z
)1−σ Y
P1−σσ
.
Proof: As in Proposition 1, the optimal price is a constant markup over marginal cost:
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p =
σ
σ − 1
1
z
and thus real gross profits are:
rij(z) =
1
P
(
σ
σ − 1
1
z
)1−σ Yj
P1−σj σ
In the first stage, the FOCs are:
α¯rih(z)− f/P− γ
(
nihr
2
ih(z)Var(αh) + rih(z)ni f (z)ri f (z)Cov(αh, α f )
)
+ λh − µh = 0
α¯ri f (z)− f/P− γ
(
ni f r
2
i f (z)Var(α f ) + ri f (z)nih(z)rih(z)Cov(αh, α f )
)
+ λ f − µ f = 0
From the above we have that:
nih =
dihri f (z)− di f rih(z)ρ + ri f (z) (λh − µh)− rih(z)ρ
(
λ f − µ f
)
γVar(α)r2ih(z)ri f (z) (1− ρ2)
ni f =
di f rih(z)− dihri f (z)ρ + rih(z)
(
λ f − µ f
)− ri f (z)ρ (λh − µh)
γVar(α)r2i f (z)rih(z) (1− ρ2)
where
dij ≡ α¯rij(z)− f/P
To get rid of the upper boundmultipliers µh and µ f , I now find a restriction on parameters
such that it is always optimal to choose nij(z) < 1. When the optimal solution is nij = 0,
then this holds trivially. If instead nij > 0, and thus λj = 0, then it must hold that:
nij =
dijrik(z)− dikrij(z)ρ
γVar(α)r2ij(z)rik(z) (1− ρ2)
< 1
for all j, where k 6= j. For the home country, this becomes:
(α¯rih(z)− f/P) ri f (z)−
(
α¯ri f (z)− f/P
)
rih(z)ρ < γVar(α)r
2
ih(z)ri f (z)
(
1− ρ2
)
Invoking symmetry:
(
α¯uzσ−1 − f/P
)
uzσ−1 −
(
α¯uzσ−1 − f/P
)
uzσ−1ρ < γVar(α)u2z2(σ−1)uzσ−1
(
1− ρ2
)
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(
α¯uzσ−1 − f/P
)
(1− ρ) < γVar(α)u2z2(σ−1)
(
1− ρ2
)
(
α¯uzσ−1 − f/P
)
< γVar(α)u2z2(σ−1) (1+ ρ)
where u = 1P
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ Y
P1−σσ . Rearranging:
γ >
1
Var(α)uzσ−1 (1+ ρ)
(
α¯− f/P
zσ−1u
)
(82)
The RHS of the above inequality is a function of the productivity z. For the inequality to
hold for any z, it suffices to hold for the productivity z that maximizes the RHS. It is easy
to verify that such z is:
zmax =
(
2 f
α¯u˜
) 1
σ−1
(83)
where u˜ =
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ Y
P1−σσ . Therefore a sufficient condition to have 82 is:
γ >
1
Var(α)u 2 fα¯u˜ (1+ ρ)
(
α¯− f
2 f
α¯u˜ u˜
)
= P
α¯2
Var(α)4 f (1+ ρ)
(84)
In what follows, I show that if the above inequality holds, the optimal price index is given
by:
P =
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)(1+θ) (κ4)
− 1θ+1 (85)
where χ depends only on σ and θ, and κ4 ≡ α¯2MDσγ
((
σ
σ−1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯
) θ
1−σ ( σ−1
θ+σ−1
)
. There-
fore the risk aversion has to satisfy:
γ >
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)(1+θ) (κ4)
− 1θ+1 α¯
2
Var(α)4 f (1+ ρ)
Rearranging:
γ >
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)θ

α¯2MDFTσ
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯
) θ
1−σ (
σ − 1
θ + σ − 1
)
− 1θ (
DFT α¯
4 f
) θ+1
θ
(86)
where the right hand side is only function of parameters.
If (86) holds, then any firm will always choose to set nij(z) < 1. Then, given the
symmetry of the economy, each firm will either sell to both the domestic and foreign
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market, or to none. This implies that the FOC becomes:
α¯r(z)− f/P− γnih(z)r2(z)Var(αh) (1+ ρ) + λh = 0
I now guess and verify that the optimal nih(z) is such that: if z > z
∗ then nih(z) > 0,
otherwise nih(z) = 0. First I find such cutoff by solving nih(z
∗) = 0:
z∗ =
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 f P1−σσ
α¯Y
) 1
σ−1
and the corresponding optimal n(z) is:
n(z) =
1
γ
α¯
Var(α) (1+ ρ)
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
If the guess is correct, then it must be that, when z < z∗, the FOC is satisfied with a
positive λh and thus n(z) = 0. Indeed, notice that setting n(z) = 0 gives:
α¯r(z)− f + λh = 0
and so the multiplier is:
λh = f − α¯r(z)
which is positive only if f > α¯r(z), that is, when z < z∗. Therefore the guess is verified.
Lastly, the optimal solution can be written as:
n(z) =
DFT
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
where DFT ≡ α¯Var(α)(1+ρ) is the Diversification Index.
Equilibrium with free trade. Assuming as before that θ > σ− 1, and normalizing the
wage to 1, current account balance implies that total income is:
YFT = wi L˜i + Πi = L˜+ κ3P
1+θ
FT Y
θ
σ−1 (87)
where κ3 ≡ 2MDFTγ (x)
θ
1−σ α¯
[
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
]
and where x ≡ ( σσ−1)σ−1 σ fα¯ .
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The price index equation is:
P1−σFT = α¯2M
∫ ∞
z∗
nji(z)pji(z)
1−σθz−θ−1dz =
= Y
−θ−1+σ
1−σ
FT P
2−σ+θ
FT κ4
where κ4 ≡ α¯2MDFTσγ (x)
θ
1−σ
(
σ−1
θ+σ−1
)
. Rearranging:
Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
FT /κ4 = P
1+θ
FT (88)
Plug equation (88) into equation (87):
YFT = L˜+ κ3P
1+θ
FT Y
θ
σ−1
FT =
= L˜+
κ3
κ4
Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
FT Y
θ
σ−1
FT = L˜+
κ3
κ4
YFT
and therefore total income is:
YFT = χL˜ (89)
where χ ≡ σ(
σ−1
θ+σ−1)
σ( σ−1θ+σ−1)−[ σ−1−θθ+σ−1+ θθ+2σ−2 ]
, and the price index is:
PFT =
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)(1+θ) (κ4)
− 1θ+1 (90)
8.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3
In Lemma 1, under autarky we impose that
γ > γ˜A ≡
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)θ

α¯MDAσ
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯
) θ
1−σ (
σ − 1
θ + σ − 1
)
− 1θ (
DAα¯
4 f
) 1+θ
θ
In Lemma 2, under free trade we impose that
γ > γ˜FT ≡
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)θ

α¯2MDFTσ
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯
) θ
1−σ (
σ − 1
θ + σ − 1
)
− 1θ (
DFT α¯
4 f
) θ+1
θ
=
80
= γ˜A
1
1+ ρ
Thus we can combine Lemma 1 and 2 and state that if
γ >
(
χL˜
) θ+1−σ
(1−σ)θ

α¯Mσ
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 σ f
α¯
) θ
1−σ (
σ − 1
θ + σ − 1
)
− 1θ (
α¯
4 f
) 1+θ
θ
max
{
1
1+ ρ
, 1
}
,
then
n(z) = 0 if z ≤ z∗
n(z) =
D
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
r(z)
if z > z∗
8.1.8 Proof of Proposition 4
The Sharpe Ratio is defined as
SR(z) =
E
[
piFT(z)
PFT
]
Std
[
piFT(z)
PFT
] .
Under free trade expected real profits are
E
[
piFT(z)
PFT
]
=
1
P
(
2α¯n(z)
(
σ
σ − 1
1
z
)1−σ Y
P1−σσ
− 2 f n(z)
)
=
= 2α¯
D
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)1− f P1−σσ(
σ
σ−1
1
z
)1−σ
Yα¯

 =
= 2α¯
D
γ
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)2
.
Instead, under free trade the standard deviation of real profits is
Std
[
piFT(z)
PFT
]
=
√
Var(α)
(
pi(z)
P
)2
+Var(α)
(
pi(z)
P
)2
+ 2
(
pi(z)
P
)2
Cov (αH, αF) =
81
=
pi(z)
P
Std(α)
√
2(1+ ρ) =
=
D
γ
(
1−
(
z∗FT
z
)σ−1)
Std(α)
√
2(1+ ρ).
Therefore the firm-level Sharpe Ratio under free trade is
SRFT(z) =
2α¯Dγ
(
1−
(
z∗FT
z
)σ−1)2
D
γ
(
1−
(
z∗FT
z
)σ−1)
Std(α)
√
2(1+ ρ)
=
=
√
2
1+ ρ
α¯
Std(α)
(
1−
(
z∗FT
z
)σ−1)
.
Similarly, under autarky the Sharpe Ratio equals
SRA(z) =
α¯
Std(α)
(
1−
(
z∗A
z
)σ−1)
.
Therefore the Sharpe Ratio changes by
SˆR(z) =
SRFT(z)
SRA(z)
=
√
2
1+ ρ
(
1−
(
z∗FT
z
)σ−1)
(
1−
(
z∗A
z
)σ−1)
Substituting the entry cutoffs from Lemma 1 and 2, and then substituting the equilibrium
solutions for P and Y from equations (80)-(81) and (89)-(90), we obtain
=
√
2
1+ ρ
(
1− (1+ ρ)− σ−1θ+1 (2) σ−1θ+1 ψ (z)1−σ
)
(
1− (z)1−σ ψ
)
where
ψ ≡ γ 1−σθ+1 M σ−1θ+1 (L˜) −σ(1+θ) f 1+θ σ˜. (91)
and σ˜ ≡ ( σσ−1)σ−1
(
σ( σ−1θ+σ−1)
σ( σ−1θ+σ−1)−[ σ−1−θθ+σ−1+ θθ+2σ−2 ]
) −σ
(1+θ) ((
σ
σ−1
)−θ
σ
θ+1−σ
1−σ
(
σ−1
θ+σ−1
)) σ−1
θ+1
σ.
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The change in the Sharpe Ratio is increasing in firm productivity:
∂SˆR(z)
∂z
=
√
2
1+ ρ
(
(σ − 1)(1+ ρ)− σ−1θ+1 (2) σ−1θ+1 (z)−σ ψ
) (
1− (z)1−σ ψ
)
−
(
(σ − 1) (z)−σ ψ
) (
1− (1+ ρ)− σ−1θ+1 (2) σ−1θ+1 (z)1−σ ψ
)
(
1− (z)1−σ ψ
)2
this is always positive since
(1+ ρ)−
σ−1
θ+1 (2)
σ−1
θ+1
(
1− (z)1−σ ψ
)
> 1− (1+ ρ)− σ−1θ+1 (2) σ−1θ+1 (z)1−σ ψ
(1+ ρ)−
σ−1
θ+1 (2)
σ−1
θ+1 > 1
2 > (1+ ρ)
1 > ρ
The change in the Sharpe Ratio is decreasing in the correlation as long as
∂SˆR(z)
∂ρ
=
1(
1− (z)1−σ k
)√2 [−1
2
(1+ ρ)−
3
2 +
(
σ − 1
θ + 1
+
1
2
)
(1+ ρ)−
σ−1
θ+1− 32 (2)
σ−1
θ+1 ψ (z)1−σ
]
< 0
(
σ − 1
θ + 1
+
1
2
)
(2)
σ+θ
θ+1 ψ (z)1−σ < (1+ ρ)
σ−1
θ+1
8.1.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Welfare under autarky is:
WA =
YA
PA
−M
∫
z∗
γ
2
Var
(
pi(z)
PA
)
θz−θ−1dz =
=
YA
PA
−M
∫
z∗
γ
2
Var(α)n2(z)r2(z)θz−θ−1dz
since marketing costs are non-stochastic. Then
WA =
YA
PA
− M
2
Var(α)
D2
γ
∫
z∗
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)2
θz−θ−1dz =
=
YA
PA
− M
2
Var(α)
D2
γ
∫
z∗
(
1+
(
z∗
z
)2(σ−1)
− 2
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)
θz−θ−1dz =
=
YA
PA
− M
2
Var(α)
D2
γ
(z∗)−θ
(
σ − 1− θ
θ + σ − 1 +
θ
θ + 2− 2σ
)
=
83
=
YA
PA
− PθAY
θ
σ−1
A
M
2γ
Dα¯x
θ
1−σ
(
θ
θ − 2+ 2σ +
σ − 1− θ
θ + σ − 1
)
=
=
YA
PA
− κ5PθAY
θ
σ−1
A (92)
where κ5 = M
DAα¯
2γ (x)
θ
1−σ
[
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
]
. Let’s further simplify the above:
WA =
(
χL˜
) σθ
(σ−1)(1+θ) (κ2)
1
θ+1 − κ5
(
χL˜
) θσ
(σ−1)(1+θ) (κ2)
− θθ+1 =
=
(
χL˜
) σθ
(σ−1)(1+θ)
[
(κ2)
1
θ+1 − κ5 (κ2)−
θ
θ+1
]
(93)
Welfare under free trade is instead:
WFT =
Y
P
−M
∫ ∞
z∗
γ
2
Var
(
pi(z)
P
)
θz−θ−1dz =
=
Y
P
−M
∫ ∞
z∗
γ
2
(
Var(α)
(
piHH(z)
P
)2
+Var(α)
(
piHF(z)
P
)2
+ 2
piHF(z)
P
piHH(z)
P
Cov (αH, αF)
)
θz−θ−1dz
where piij are gross profits (since marketing costs are non-stochastic). By symmetry (and
by absence of trade costs):
WFT =
Y
P
−M
∫ ∞
z∗
γ
2
(
Var(α)
(
pi(z)
P
)2
+Var(α)
(
pi(z)
P
)2
+ 2
(
pi(z)
P
)2
Cov (αH, αF)
)
θz−θ−1dz =
=
Y
P
−MγVar(α) (1+ ρ)
∫ ∞
z∗
(
pi(z)
P
)2
θz−θ−1dz =
=
Y
P
−MVar(α) (1+ ρ) D
2
γ
∫ ∞
z∗
(
1−
(
z∗
z
)σ−1)2
θz−θ−1dz =
=
Y
P
−MVar(α) (1+ ρ) D
2
γ
(z∗)−θ
(
σ − 1− θ
θ + σ − 1 +
θ
θ + 2− 2σ
)
=
=
Y
P
−MVar(α) (1+ ρ) D
2
γ
((
σ
σ − 1
)σ−1 f P1−σσ
α¯Y
)− θσ−1 (
σ − 1− θ
θ + σ − 1 +
θ
θ + 2− 2σ
)
=
=
Y
P
− κ6PθY θσ−1 (94)
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where κ6 = M
1
γ α¯DFT (x)
θ
1−σ
[
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
]
. Further simplify:
WFT =
(
χL˜
)1− θ+1−σ
(1−σ)(1+θ) (κ4)
1
θ+1 − κ6PθY θσ−1 =
=
(
χL˜
) σθ
(σ−1)(1+θ)
[
(κ4)
1
θ+1 − κ6 (κ4)−
θ
θ+1
]
(95)
Using equations (93) and (95), welfare gains are:
Wˆ =
WFT
WA
=
=
(
χL˜
) σθ
(σ−1)(1+θ)
[
(κ4)
1
θ+1 − κ6 (κ4)−
θ
θ+1
]
(
χL˜
) σθ
(σ−1)(1+θ)
[
(κ2)
1
θ+1 − κ5 (κ2)−
θ
θ+1
] =
=
(κ4)
1
θ+1 − κ6 (κ4)−
θ
θ+1(
κ4
1+ρ
2
) 1
θ+1 − κ5
(
κ4
1+ρ
2
)− θθ+1 =
= (2)
1
θ+1 (1+ ρ)−
1
θ+1 (96)
since I set Var(α) = α¯ = 1. Given the symmetry, with free trade λjj =
1
2 in both ACR and
in mymodel. In autarky instead, λjj = 1. Therefore the change in trade shares is the same
across models, and we can use the ACR formula to compare welfare gains:
WˆACR =
(
λjj
)− 1θ = (1
2
)− 1θ
(97)
Therefore I can write welfare gains in my model as:
Wˆ =
(
1
2
)− 1θ+1
(1+ ρ)−
1
θ+1 =
=
(
1
2
)− 1θ (1
2
) 1
θ(θ+1)
(1+ ρ)−
1
θ+1
Taking logs
lnWˆ = −1
θ
ln
(
1
2
)
+
1
θ(θ + 1)
ln
(
1
2
)
− 1
θ + 1
ln (1+ ρ) =
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= WˆACR − WˆACR 1(θ + 1) −
1
θ + 1
ln (1+ ρ)
= lnWˆACR · θθ + 1 −
1
θ + 1
ln (1+ ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
diversification effect

8.1.10 Model with free-entry
I assume that there is free-entry of firms. Specifically, there is an unbounded set of risk-
averse entrepreneurs that decide whether to pay a fixed entry cost to draw a productivity
level and start a business. The free-entry assumption implies that entrepreneurs enter up
to the point in which the expected utility of running a firm equals the entry cost:
∫
z∗
E
(
pii(z)
Pi
)
θz−θ−1dz− γ
2
∫
z∗
Var
(
pii(z)
Pi
)
θz−θ−1dz = f e (98)
Note that this is different from the usual free-entry condition inMelitz (2003), where firms
enter until expected profits are equated to entry costs.
Free-trade. Equation (98) can be expanded as:
2
(
α¯
∫ ∞
z∗
n(z)r(z)θz−θ−1dz−
∫ ∞
z∗
f
P
n(z)θz−θ−1dz
)
− γ
2
∫
z∗
ξ(z)θz−θ−1dz = f e
where ξ(z) ≡
(
Var(α)
(
piHH(z)
P
)2
+Var(α)
(
piHF(z)
P
)2
+ 2piHF(z)P
piHH(z)
P Cov (αH, αF)
)
, which
after some algebra becomes
PFT = (ζ1)
− 1θ Y
1
1−σ
FT
where ζ1 ≡ α¯DFTγ f e (x)
−θ
σ−1
(
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
)
. The price index equation is
Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
FT /ζ2 = MP
1+θ
FT
where ζ2 ≡ α¯2DFTσγ (x)
θ
1−σ
(
σ−1
θ+σ−1
)
. The current account balance is
YFT = L˜+ Mζ3P
1+θ
FT Y
θ
σ−1
FT
where ζ3 ≡ ζ1 f e. Replace this into the price index equation:
YFT = L˜+Y
θ
σ−1
FT ζ3Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
FT /ζ2
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which rearranged gives:
YFT = χL˜
where
χ =
σ (σ − 1)
(σ − 1)2 + θ − θ(θ+σ−1)θ+2σ−2
Note that YFT is exactly the same as in the model without free entry. Thus the price index
is
PFT =
(
α¯
DFT
f eγ
(x)
−θ
σ−1
(
σ − 1− θ
θ + σ − 1 +
θ
θ + 2σ − 2
))− 1θ (
χL˜
) 1
(1−σ)
The number of firms is
MFT =
(
χL˜
) σ
(σ−1)
(
α¯
DFT
f eγ
(x)
−θ
σ−1
(
σ − 1− θ
θ + σ − 1 +
θ
θ + 2σ − 2
)) 1+θ
θ
/ζ2
Autarky. Under autarky the free entry equation becomes
PA = (ζ5)
− 1θ Y
1
(1−σ)
A
where ζ5 ≡ 12 DAf eγ (x)
θ
1−σ α¯
[
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
]
. The price index equation implies:
Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
A /ζ6 = MAP
1+θ
A
where ζ6 ≡ α¯DAσγ (x)
θ
1−σ
(
σ−1
θ+σ−1
)
. The current account balance is:
YA = L˜+ ζ5MAP
1+θ
A Y
θ
σ−1
A
Thus income under autarky and free entry is:
YA = χL˜
where χ = 11−ζ5/ζ6 is the same as before. The price index is
PA = (ζ5)
− 1θ (χL˜) 1(1−σ) =
=
(
DAα¯
2 f eγ
(x)
θ
1−σ
[
σ − 1− θ
θ + σ − 1 +
θ
θ + 2σ − 2
])− 1θ (
χL˜
) 1
(1−σ)
and the number of firms is
MA = Y
θ+1−σ
1−σ
A P
−1−θ
A /ζ6 =
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= (ζ5)
1+θ
θ
(
χL˜
) σ
σ−1 /ζ6
It is easy to verify that the change of the number of firms between the two equilibria
equals:
MFT
MA
= (2DFT)
1
θ (99)
Welfare gains from trade. The welfare gains from trade with free-entry of firms are:
Wˆ =
WFT
WA
=
w
P +
Π
P − R
w
P +
Π
P − R
=
1
PFT
+ MFT f
e
1
PA
+ MA f e
=
=
(
α¯DFTf eγ (x)
−θ
σ−1
(
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
)) 1
θ (
χL˜
) 1
σ−1 + MFT f
e
(
DAα¯
2 f eγ (x)
θ
1−σ
[
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
]) 1
θ (
χL˜
) 1
σ−1 + MA f e
=
=
(
α¯DFTf eγ (x)
−θ
σ−1
(
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
)) 1
θ (
χL˜
) 1
σ−1 +
(
χL˜
) σ
(σ−1)
(
1
2ζ1
) 1+θ
θ
/ζ2 f
e
(
DAα¯
2 f eγ (x)
θ
1−σ
[
σ−1−θ
θ+σ−1 +
θ
θ+2σ−2
]) 1
θ (
χL˜
) 1
σ−1 +
(
χL˜
) σ
σ−1
(
1
2ζ5
) 1+θ
θ
/ζ6 f e
=
= (2DFT)
1
θ
Therefore welfare gains can be written as
lnWˆ = lnWˆACR − 1θ ln(1+ ρ)
8.1.11 Covariance of log shocks
Starting from the covariance of the log-change of the shocks:
Cov
(
∆α˜j,∆α˜k
)
= E
[
∆α˜j∆α˜k
]− E [∆α˜j] E [∆α˜k] =
= E
[(
α˜j,t − α˜j,t−1
)
(α˜k,t − α˜k,t−1)
]− E [α˜j,t − α˜j,t−1] E [α˜k,t − α˜k,t−1] =
= Cov
(
α˜j,t, α˜k,t
)− Cov (α˜j,t, α˜k,t−1)− Cov (α˜j,t−1, α˜k,t)+ Cov (α˜j,t−1, α˜k,t−1) =
= 2Cov
(
α˜j, α˜k
)− 2Cov (α˜j,t−1, α˜k,t) (100)
where the last equality follows because the covariance is assumed constant over the
estimation period, i.e. Cov
(
α˜j,t, α˜k,t
)
= Cov
(
α˜j,t−1, α˜k,t−1
)
= Cov
(
α˜j, α˜k
)
, and by sym-
metry of the covariance matrix. By Assumption 4c, Cov
(
α˜j,t−1α˜k,t
)
= 0 for all j and k.
Therefore, the covariance of the log of the shocks is
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Cov
(
α˜j, α˜k
)
= Cov
(
∆α˜j,∆α˜k
)
/2.
8.1.12 Equivalence in the moments estimation
In this section I prove that, if the shocks are i.i.d. over time, computing the moments
of the shocks using variation across time for each year firm and taking the average across
firms is equivalent to stacking together the observations for all years and computing the
moments once.
To save notation, define X ≡ ∆α˜x and Y ≡ ∆α˜y, where x and y are any two des-
tinations. The covariance between X and Y, computed stacking together the structural
residuals, is:
Cov(X,Y) =
1
T · S
T·S
∑
k=1
(yk − y¯) (xk − x¯) (101)
where xk (yk) is the observed change in the log of the shock in destination x(y) for k, where
k is a pair of firm s and year t, S is the number of firms selling to both x and y, T is the
number of years. Since x¯ ≡ E[∆α˜x] = 0 and y¯ ≡ E[∆α˜p] = 0, the above becomes:
Cov(X,Y) =
1
T · S
T·S
∑
k=1
ykxk (102)
If instead I compute the covariance for each firm, it equals:
Cov(X,Y)s =
1
T
T
∑
y=1
ytsxts (103)
where xts (yts) is the observed change in the log of the shock in destination x (y) in year t
and for firm s. The average across firms of this covariance is simply:
1
S
S
∑
s=1
Cov(X,Y)s =
1
S
S
∑
s=1
1
T
T
∑
t=1
ytsxts =
=
1
T · S
S
∑
s=1
T
∑
t=1
ytsxts =
1
T · S
T·S
∑
k=1
ykxk (104)
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by the associative property. Therefore, equation (102) is equivalent to equation (104). A
similar proof works for the expected value of the shocks.
8.1.13 Allowing for aggregate shocks
Assume that the log demand shocks can be decomposed into a macro component, com-
mon to all firms, and a firm-destination component:
α˜js = ξ˜ j + ς˜ js
The macro shock represents any aggregate demand shock, for example a financial crisis, a
monetary policy shock, or an exchange rate fluctuation, that affect all firms selling to that
country. In the structural equation (35), the macro shock ξ˜ j is absorbed by the destination
fixed effect. In order to back it out, I use as before the assumption that the parameters
stay constant between two consecutive years, and take the first difference of both the
estimated destination fixed effect and the residual (controlling for supply shocks as in
equation (38)):
δjt − δj,t−1 + ε js,t − ε js,t−1 = ∆ξ˜ j,t + ∆ς˜ js,t = ∆α˜js,t
Using ∆α˜js,t, I compute the moments of the demand shocks in exactly the same way I do
in the baseline, thus assuming that α˜js is normally distributed.
8.1.14 Estimation of risk aversion
In equation (43), both the marginal expected profits and their marginal variance are not
observable in the data. However, I do observe gross profits from each destination, since
they are a share σ of observed revenues, due to the CES assumption. The ratio between
expected marginal gross profits, MEGPjs, and observed gross profits, GPjs, for firm s and
market j, is:
MEGPjs
GPjs
=
α¯jrjs
αjsnjsrjs
=
α¯j
αjsnjs
(105)
Taking logs and rearranging:
ln
(
MEGPjs
)
= ln
(
GPjs
)
+ ln
(
α¯j
)− ln (αjs)− ln (njs) (106)
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Note that ln
(
αjs
)− ln (njs) is just the residual from the regression in (38), which I have
already estimated for 2005 (and for all other years). I directly observe ln
(
GPjs
)
in the data,
and I have already estimated ln
(
α¯j
)
in section (3.1). Therefore, I can back out MEGPjs for
all firms and destinations in 2005.
To compute the marginal variance, note that the total covariance of gross profits in
country j, i.e. the variance in j plus the covariances with all other countries, equals:
CGPjs = ∑
k
Cov(GPjs,GPks) = ∑
k
rjsrksnjsnksCov(αj, αk) (107)
I use data on observed gross profits from 1995 to 2004, for each firm-destination pair, to
compute the left hand side of equation (107):
CGPjs = ∑
k
1
T
T
∑
t=1
(GPkst − E[GPks])
(
GPjst − E[GPjs]
)
(108)
Then I compute rjs in equation (107) as
MEGPjs
α¯j
for all s and j, and since I have already
estimated Cov(αj, αk) in section (3.1), I only need to solve for the vector nsj. Thus, for
each firm s selling to Gmarkets, I solve a system of G equations (107) in G unknowns, i.e.
ngs(z), for g = 1, ...G.
Finally, I compute the marginal variance of gross profits as
MVGPjs = ∑
k
rjsnksrksCov(αj, αk) (109)
8.1.15 CRRA Utility
In the baseline model, I assume that entrepreneurs maximize an expected CARA utility
in real income. One shortcoming of the CARA utility is that the absolute risk aversion is
independent from wealth. This implies that large firms display the same risk aversion as
small firms, which may be too restrictive. In this subsection, I consider an extension of
the model where the entrepreneurs have a CRRA utility, and thus a decreasing absolute
risk aversion. In particular, the owners now maximize the following utility:
max E
[
1
1− ρ
(
yi(z)
Pi
)1−ρ]
(110)
where the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is given by
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ARA = ρ
(
yi(z)
Pi
)−1
(111)
and therefore is decreasing in the size of the firm, and the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion is simply ρ > 0.
Define z ≡ yi(z)Pi . Take a second-order expansion of E
[
1
1−ρz
1−ρ
]
around z¯ ≡ E
(
yi(z)
Pi
)
:
E
[
1
1− ρz
1−ρ
]
≈ E
[
1
1− ρ z¯
1−ρ + z¯−ρ (z− z¯) + −ρ
1− ρ
1
2
z¯−ρ−1 (z− z¯)2
]
=
=
1
1− ρ z¯
1−ρ + z¯−ρE (z− z¯)− ρ
(1− ρ)2 z¯
−ρ−1E (z− z¯)2 =
=
1
1− ρ z¯
1−ρ − ρ
(1− ρ)2 z¯
−ρ−1Var (z)
Multiplying the above expression by 1− ρ, we obtain:
max
(
E
[
yi(z)
Pi
])1−ρ
− ρ
2
(
E
[
yi(z)
Pi
])−1−ρ
Var
(
yi(z)
Pi
)
. (112)
8.2 Data Appendix
Trade data. Statistics Portugal collects data on export and import transactions by firms
that are located in Portugal on a monthly basis. These data include the value and quan-
tity of internationally traded goods (i) between Portugal and other Member States of the
EU (intra-EU trade) and (ii) by Portugal with non-EU countries (extra-EU trade). Data
on extra-EU trade are collected from customs declarations, while data on intra-EU trade
are collected through the Intrastat system, which, in 1993, replaced customs declarations
as the source of trade statistics within the EU. The same information is used for offi-
cial statistics and, besides small adjustments, the merchandise trade transactions in our
dataset aggregate to the official total exports and imports of Portugal. Each transaction
record includes, among other information, the firm’s tax identifier, an eight-digit Com-
bined Nomenclature product code, the destination/origin country, the value of the trans-
action in euros, the quantity (in kilos and, in some case, additional product-specific mea-
suring units) of transacted goods, and the relevant international commercial term (FOB,
CIF, FAS, etc.). I use data on export transactions only, aggregated at the firm-destination-
year level.
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Data on firm characteristics. The second main data source, Quadros de Pessoal, is a lon-
gitudinal dataset matching virtually all firms and workers based in Portugal. Currently,
the dataset collects data on about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees. As for the trade
data, I was able to gain access to information from 1995 to 2005. The data is made avail-
able by the Ministry of Employment, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all firms
in Portugal that employ at least one worker. Each year, every firm with wage earners is
legally obliged to fill in a standardized questionnaire. Reported data cover the firm itself,
each of its plants, and each of its workers. Variables available in the dataset include the
firm’s location, industry (at 5 digits of NACE rev. 1), total employment, sales, owner-
ship structure (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or foreign), and legal
setting. Each firm entering the database is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying
number which I use to follow it over time.
The two datasets are merged by means of the firm identifier. As in Mion and Opromolla
(2014) and Cardoso and Portugal (2005), I account for sectoral and geographical speci-
ficities of Portugal by restricting the sample to include only firms based in continental
Portugal while excluding agriculture and fishery (Nace rev.1, 2-digit industries 1, 2, and
5) as well as minor service activities and extra-territorial activities (Nace rev.1, 2-digit in-
dustries 95, 96, 97, and 99). The analysis focuses on manufacturing firms only (Nace rev.1
codes 15 to 37) because of the closer relationship between the export of goods and the in-
dustrial activity of the firm. The location of the firm is measured according to the NUTS
3 regional disaggregation.
Data on L˜j. L˜j is the total number of workers in themanufacturing sector in 2005, obtained
from UNIDO. For some countries, I do not observe L˜j, and thus I set it proportional to the
population in country j. In particular, I compute L˜j = Lj/r, where r is the average ratio
of population over manufacturing workers in the other countries.
Data on M. From UNIDO, I also observe the number of establishments in the manufac-
turing sector. To compute the number of firms, Mj, I divide the number of establish-
ments in each country by the ratio between number of firms and number of establish-
ments in Portugal, which is 0.32. I obtain the number of manufacturing firms in Portugal,
MP = 27, 970, from Quadros de Pessoal. For the countries for which I do not have data
on number of establishments, I set Mj = 0.021L˜j, where 0.021 is the median ratio of work-
ers to firms in the other countries. Setting the number of firms to be proportional to the
working population of a country has been shown to be a good approximation of the data
(see Bento and Restuccia (2016) and Fernandes et al. (2016)).
Data on firms’ profits. I obtain data on firms’ net profits, investment rate, capital expendi-
tures from Central de Balanços, a repository of yearly balance sheet data for non financial
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firms in Portugal.
List of countries. The countries in the sample are the top destinations of Portuguese
exporters for which there is available data, fromWIOD or UNIDO, to construct manufac-
turing trade shares. The final list of destinations is provided in Table 3.
8.3 Algorithm used for calibration
The calibration algorithm works as follows:
1) Guess a matrix of trade costs τij (normalizing domestic trade costs to 1). Stack them
into the vector Θ.
2) Solve the trade equilibrium using the system of equations (15), (23), (25) and (26). To
solve the general equilibrium, I create a grid composed by 10,000 firms, each with a given
productivity z, and compute the optimal nij(z) for all firms and countries. By Walras’
Law, one equation is redundant. Therefore, I normalize world GDP to a constant, as in
Allen et al. (2014) and Caliendo and Parro (2014).
3) Compute aggregate trade shares, λij ≡ Xij∑k Xkj , for i 6= j, where Xij are total trade flows
from i to j, as shown in equation (22). I stack these trade shares in a N(N − 1)-element
vector mˆ(Θ) and compute the analogous moment in the data, mdata, using manufacturing
trade data in 2005.
4) Stack the differences between observed and simulated moments into a vector of length
1,190, y(Θ) ≡ mdata − mˆ(Θ). I update Θ as follows:
Θnew = Θ + εy(Θ)
where ε is arbitrarily small. The intuition is that, for example, if the trade shares predicted
by the model using some guess Θi are lower than the corresponding shares observed in
the data, i.e. yi(Θ) < 0, the new trade costs will have to be lower, Θ
new
i < Θi.
5) Iterate over 1-4 until max {y(Θ)} < tol, for tol sufficiently small.
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